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THE RESIDENCY MATCH: 




In 2002 physicians filed a lawsuit alleging that “the match,” 
the more than fifty-year-old system by which medical students 
and other applicants are assigned to medical residency programs, 
violates section 1 of the Sherman Act. Last year, without 
hearings on the issue, Congress found that the match was 
“highly efficient” and “pro-competitive” and granted a retroactive 
antitrust exemption for its operation. These seemingly 
incompatible views invite further analysis of the merits of the 
residency match from the perspective of public policy. This 
Article considers the arguments of match advocates and critics, 
evaluating both theoretical models and empirical evidence of the 
effects of the match on resident compensation. It rejects the 
assertion that matching mechanisms are necessarily inefficient, 
and instead describes factors that should be considered in an 
assessment of efficiency. The Article concludes that given the role 
of the residency match in remedying market imperfections, the 
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congressional grant of an exemption was justified. It also 
suggests, however, that further action may be required to ensure 
that the matching process obtains the maximum possible social 
benefit. 
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Medical education has long been a subject of controversy, 
and with good reason: The stakes associated with the medical 
education process are unquestionably high. They are high for 
physicians, who invest considerable money, time, and effort in 
training, and whose investment return will reflect the nature and 
quality of training they receive. Stakes are high for teaching 
hospitals, which depend on medical residents to provide care 
within their facilities. Stakes are also high for governments, 
insurance companies, employers, and others who take on the 
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responsibility of paying for services provided by teaching 
hospitals. Finally, stakes are high for patients, the immediate 
beneficiaries of residents’ services and the ultimate beneficiaries 
of residents’ training, whose length and quality of life depend on 
the quality of medical education. With so much at stake for so 
many, it is not surprising that the interests of many individuals 
and institutions, including physicians, hospitals, and 
governments, have shaped the medical education process. It is 
also not surprising that conflicts over this process have emerged. 
One of the most closely watched conflicts in recent years has 
been the 2002 lawsuit challenging the residency “match” as a 
violation of section 1 of the Sherman Act.1 The residency match is 
the system by which fourth-year medical school students and 
other applicants are matched to residency programs across the 
country. Each year, residency candidates submit a list of 
preferred residency programs, and residency programs submit a 
list of preferred residency candidates. A computer algorithm 
designed to satisfy match participants’ mutual preferences then 
assigns individual candidates to residency positions. Pointing to 
resident compensation that has been relatively static across time 
and low compared to that of nonresident physicians and other 
health care professionals, the lawsuit plaintiffs alleged that the 
match (along with residency program accreditation requirements 
and the exchange of compensation information) illegally 
restrained competition.2 
                                                          
 1. See Complaint, Jung v. Ass’n of Am. Med. Colls., 300 F. Supp. 2d 119 (D.D.C. 
2004) (No. CIV.A.02-0873 PLF) [hereinafter Complaint], http://www.savethematch.org/ 
pdf/complaint.pdf. For legal analyses of the suit, see Sanders H. Chae, Is the Match 
Illegal?, 348 NEW ENG. J. MED. 352 (2003); Frances H. Miller & Thomas L. Greaney, The 
National Resident Matching Program and Antitrust Law, 289 JAMA 913 (2003) 
(explaining the history of the match and the legal principles relevant to the Jung suit); 
Heather S. Crall, Note, Unreasonable Restraints: Antitrust Law and the National 
Residency Matching Program, 82 WASH. U. L.Q. 245 (2004); and Melinda Creasman, Note, 
Resuscitating the National Resident Matching Program: Improving Medical Resident 
Placement Through Binding Dual Matching, 56 VAND. L. REV. 1439 (2003) (arguing that 
the Jung antitrust claims are meritorious and proposing an alternative matching 
mechanism). 
 2. Complaint, supra note 1, ¶¶ 1–2. More specifically, the complaint alleged that 
the defendants violated section 1 of the Sherman Act in three ways. Id. ¶¶ 3, 97–103. 
First, the defendants exchanged information about medical residencies through various 
mechanisms, including an annual survey that aggregated salary information across 
residency programs. Id. ¶¶ 3, 73–82, 100. Second, the defendants operated or participated 
in the match. Id. ¶¶ 3, 83–86, 100. Third, in implementing accreditation standards, the 
organization responsible for accrediting residency programs limited the number of 
residency positions available, hindered resident movement among these positions, 
encouraged match participation, and reviewed employment terms. Id. ¶¶ 3, 87–88, 100. 
The complaint claimed that the defendants’ alleged information exchange, match 
program, and accreditation activities had “the purpose and effect of artificially fixing, 
depressing, standardizing and stabilizing resident physician compensation and other 
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The plaintiffs, physicians who had participated in the match, 
sought damages and an injunction against antitrust violations.3 
Among the defendants were the National Resident Matching 
Program (NRMP), which operates the match; the Accreditation 
Council for Graduate Medical Education (ACGME), which 
accredits residency programs; the Association of American 
Medical Colleges (AAMC), an NRMP sponsor which conducts an 
annual survey of resident compensation; and individual, 
nonpublic teaching hospitals, which participate in the match and 
employ residents.4 
A plaintiff victory in the suit would have had profound 
implications for the graduate medical education system, affecting 
each of the stakeholders in the medical education process. In the 
short term, an award of damages would have benefited former 
residents but depleted the resources of defendant teaching 
hospitals. In the long term, if the plaintiffs were correct in 
arguing that the match depresses compensation,5 an injunction 
against the continued operation of the match would have 
resulted in a further transfer of resources from teaching 
hospitals to residents. The potential effects of abolishing the 
residency match, however, would have been confined neither to 
compensation issues, nor to match participants. Because the 
residency match affects the output of residency programs, 
including resident training, patient services, and medical 
research,6 its abolition would have affected society more broadly. 
Whether these effects would have been on balance beneficial or 
detrimental remains an open question. 
Congress made no attempt to resolve this question publicly 
when in 2004 it created an antitrust exemption for the residency 
match.7 Versions of the Pension Funding Equity Act of 2004 
                                                          
terms of employment.” Id. ¶ 101. 
 3. Id. ¶¶ 1, 10–13. 
 4. Id. ¶¶ 15–17, 22–50. In February 2004, the district court allowed the suit to go 
forward with respect to defendants National Residency Matching Program (NRMP), 
Accreditation Council for Graduate Medical Education (ACGME), and Association of 
American Medical Colleges (AAMC), as well as many of the individual teaching hospitals. 
Jung, 300 F. Supp. 2d at 173–74. The court granted the motions to dismiss some 
defendants, including the American Hospital Association, the American Medical 
Association, the Council of Medical Specialty Societies, and the American Board of 
Medical Specialties. Id. These four organizations and the AAMC together sponsor the 
NRMP. Complaint, supra note 1, ¶¶ 17–21. The court later dismissed the case. See infra 
note 13 and accompanying text. 
 5. See supra note 2. 
 6. See Accreditation Council for Graduate Medical Education, ACGME Fact Sheet, 
http://www.acgme.org/acWebsite/newsRoom/newsRm_factSheet.asp (last visited Oct. 1, 
2005) (describing the functions of residency programs). 
 7. Pension Funding Equity Act of 2004 § 207, 15 U.S.C.A. § 37b (West Supp. 2005). 
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passed both the House and Senate with no mention of any 
residency-related antitrust exemption.8 It was not until the final 
bill emerged from the conference committee that a section 
captioned “Confirmation of Antitrust Status of Graduate Medical 
Resident Matching Programs” first appeared.9 This section, 
which applies to conduct both before and after the law’s 
passage,10 states that “[i]t shall not be unlawful under the 
antitrust laws to sponsor, conduct, or participate in a graduate 
medical education residency matching program,”11 and prohibits 
the admission of match-related evidence to support an antitrust 
claim.12 The match antitrust suit defendants moved for judgment 
on the pleadings, and in August 2004, the district court 
dismissed the case.13 Despite its powerful effect, the statute was 
signed into law without debate concerning the antitrust 
exemption either in the Senate Judiciary Committee or on the 
House or Senate floors,14 a state of affairs that elicited strong 
objections from several senators. Senator Kohl, for example, said 
that 
[i]n general it is bad policy to provide exemptions to the 
antitrust laws. . . . We should have had the opportunity to 
debate this issue and determine whether there was any 
merit to the exemption, rather than see the exemption 
mysteriously appear on an unrelated bill. It appears that 
this provision, enacted in this way, is nothing more than a 
giveaway to one particular special interest. Without judging 
                                                          
 8. See Pension Funding Equity Act of 2003, H.R. 3108, 108th Cong. (as passed by 
House, Oct. 8, 2003); Pension Stability Act, H.R. 3108, 108th Cong. (as passed by Senate, 
Jan. 28, 2004). 
 9. See H.R. REP. NO. 108-457, at 17 (2004) (Conf. Rep.). 
 10. See 15 U.S.C.A. § 37b(c) (“This section shall take effect on April 10, 2004, shall 
apply to conduct whether it occurs prior to, on, or after April 10, 2004, and shall apply to 
all judicial and administrative actions or other proceedings pending on April 10, 2004.”). 
 11. Id. § 37b(b)(2).  
 12. Id. (“Evidence of any of the conduct described in the preceding sentence shall 
not be admissible in Federal court to support any claim or action alleging a violation of 
the antitrust laws.”). 
 13. Jung v. Ass’n of Am. Med. Colls., 339 F. Supp. 2d 26, 46–47 (D.D.C. 2004). After 
determining that the plaintiffs’ claims of antitrust conspiracy hinged on allegations 
related to the match, and that the newly enacted statute prohibited the admission of 
match-related evidence, the court dismissed the case. Id. at 36–39. The court also rejected 
the plaintiffs’ constitutional challenges to the antitrust exemption statutory provisions. 
Id. at 40–46. In February 2005, the court rejected a request to reconsider the dismissal; 
the plaintiffs subsequently filed notice to appeal. Myrle Croasdale, Judge Upholds 
Dismissal of Match Lawsuit, AM. MED. NEWS, Feb. 14, 2005, at 20, 20. 
 14. See 149 CONG. REC. H9285 (daily ed. Oct. 8, 2003); 150 CONG. REC. S223 (daily 
ed. Jan. 26, 2004). 
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the merits of the issue, we should have had an opportunity 
to explore it and make that decision for ourselves.15 
This Article assesses the merits of the antitrust exemption 
by analyzing whether the residency match is desirable from a 
policy perspective. Only with a thorough understanding of the 
potential effects of the residency match can it be determined 
whether the exemption was improvidently granted and should 
therefore be modified or eliminated.16 Building on an analysis of 
arguments on both sides of the residency match debate, this 
Article explores the implications of the residency match for social 
welfare. 
At the core of the plaintiffs’ complaint is the allegation that 
the residency match has depressed compensation;17 mean 
resident compensation levels are mostly in the $40,000 range.18 
The role of the residency match in determining these 
compensation levels, however, is unclear. Match rules restrict the 
timing of offers and govern the matching of residents to 
programs, but say nothing whatsoever about resident stipends.19 
The complaint alleged that the match “enabled employers to 
obtain resident physicians without . . . a bidding war,”20 but failed 
to detail the precise mechanism by which the match depresses 
compensation. 
This Article explores several ways in which the rules of the 
match, though silent on compensation issues, may nonetheless 
affect compensation levels. Match rules restricting the formation 
                                                          
 15. 150 CONG. REC. S3979 (daily ed. Apr. 8, 2004). While there was no public debate 
on the exemption, it is likely that there was considerable discussion in private among 
legislators, legislative staff, and representatives of the affected parties. 
 16. Senator Jeff Bingaman, who has criticized the creation of the exemption and 
argued that the exemption does not apply to claims of price fixing, has said in a floor 
statement that he “will seek a future opportunity to raise this issue before this body.” 150 
CONG. REC. S5223 (daily ed. May 11, 2004). In addition, the Antitrust Modernization 
Commission, a twelve-member commission appointed by the President and congressional 
leaders, Antitrust Modernization Commission Act of 2002 § 11054(a)(1)–(5), 15 U.S.C. § 1 
(Supp. II 2002), has proposed evaluating whether industry-specific exemptions, including 
the residency match exemption, should be eliminated or time-limited. Memorandum from 
the Immunities & Exemptions Working Group to All Comm’rs 2–6 (Dec. 21, 2004), http:// 
www.amc.gov/pdf/meetings/ImmunitiesandExemptions.pdf. 
 17. Complaint, supra note 1, ¶¶ 73, 83–84. 
 18. ASS’N OF AM. MED. COLLS., 2004 AAMC SURVEY OF HOUSESTAFF STIPENDS, 
BENEFITS & FUNDING: NOVEMBER 2004 REPORT 6 tbl.2 (2004), http://www.aamc.org/data/ 
housestaff/hss2004report.pdf. See infra Part IV for an assessment of the empirical data on 
resident compensation. 
 19. See NRMP, Match Participation Agreement for Applicants and Programs § 1.0 
(2005), http://www.nrmp.org/res_match/policies/map_main.html (describing the functions 
of the matching program and noting that “the NRMP is not involved in establishing the 
terms of any residency or fellowship agreement”). 
 20. Complaint, supra note 1, ¶ 84. 
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of early contracts undermine the credibility of early offers and 
other expressions of interest, limiting the ability of residency 
candidates to use them to solicit other offers or to bargain for 
increased compensation.21 Furthermore, several models in the 
theoretical economics literature indicate that under certain 
conditions, matching mechanisms can result in lower 
compensation, suggesting that there may be a basis for the 
plaintiffs’ claim that the match is anticompetitive.22 
At the same time, however, the match facilitates competition 
by overcoming market failures that reduce the probability of 
forming efficient matches. Centralized matching mechanisms 
help ensure efficient pairings of residency programs and 
residents by delaying the competitive process, thus improving 
match participants’ access to information, and by taking full 
account of participants’ preferences.23 If Congress was correct in 
its characterization of the matching process as “highly efficient” 
and “pro-competitive,”24 then by facilitating efficient pairings the 
match expands the “output” of resident-residency program 
relationships. This increase in output could conceivably support 
an increase in resident compensation relative to a world without 
the match, and would certainly increase social welfare.25 
In a recent article, however, Professor George Priest has 
argued that mechanisms that impose restrictions on offer timing, 
like many other types of competitive restraint, actually reduce 
aggregate welfare.26 To the extent that Priest’s arguments apply 
to the residency match, they reinforce the plaintiffs’ claims that 
the match is anticompetitive. This Article argues, however, that 
while Priest’s work provides important insights, it does not 
conclusively demonstrate that early-offer restrictions reduce 
welfare, particularly in the context of medical residencies. While 
some match participants might gain from early-offer competition, 
a significant portion of these gains would result from the 
redistribution of resources among market participants, rather 
than an increase in aggregate welfare. An overall assessment of 
                                                          
 21. See infra Part III.A. 
 22. See infra Part III.A. 
 23. See infra Part III.B. 
 24. One of the congressional findings is that “[a]ntitrust lawsuits challenging the 
matching process, regardless of their merit or lack thereof, have the potential to 
undermine this highly efficient, pro-competitive, and long-standing process.” 15 U.S.C.A. 
§ 37b(a)(1)(E) (West Supp. 2005). 
 25. See infra Part III.B. 
 26. George L. Priest, Reexamining the Market for Judicial Clerks and Other 
Assortative Matching Markets, 22 YALE J. ON REG. 123, 204 (2005); see also infra Part 
III.C (responding to Professor Priest’s article). 
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welfare requires a careful weighing of the many factors affecting 
the benefits and costs associated with timing restrictions. 
Much of the work examining the effects of matching 
mechanisms, both supportive and critical, has focused on the 
nature of the matching process and the quality of matches 
achieved, rather than on the potential interaction between 
matching mechanisms and compensation. This focus is natural, 
given that the match itself places no direct constraints on 
compensation. But if the match does affect compensation, it is 
important to consider the relationship between these effects and 
efficiency. This Article explains that institutional features of the 
residency market tend to limit the impact of lower compensation 
levels, and suggests that any such impact may be outweighed by 
the benefits reaped through the use of the matching mechanism. 
Critics of the match may argue that such a sanguine 
appraisal of the effects of the match is inappropriate, given the 
low level of resident compensation relative to that of other health 
care professionals.27 These differences may result from a variety 
of factors unrelated to the match, however, including differences 
in productivity levels, nonmonetary compensation in the form of 
training, and the value of the opportunity to enter the medical 
profession. While not conclusive, empirical comparisons of 
markets with and without matching mechanisms support the 
argument that the match does not significantly affect 
compensation. 
Ultimately, this Article’s analysis suggests that Congress 
was justified in stepping into the residency match controversy. 
Given its decision, however, Congress also has an obligation to 
assure that society gains the maximum possible benefit from the 
match. Toward this end, this Article proposes that Congress 
adopt measures that would require programs to offer binding 
sample contracts prior to the match and facilitate the creation of 
individually-negotiated contracts. 
Part II of this Article explains the medical education process 
and the mechanics of the residency match. Part III explores the 
effects of the match on competition and efficiency. Section A 
discusses ways in which the match might depress compensation, 
while section B explains the argument that matching 
mechanisms benefit their participants by generating higher-
quality matches than could otherwise be obtained. Section C 
expands on the analysis in the previous sections by evaluating 
                                                          
 27. See discussion infra Part IV (comparing resident compensation with that of 
other health care providers). 
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the extent to which the match might be an economically efficient 
institution, using as a starting point Professor George Priest’s 
recent work analyzing assortative matching markets.28 Section D 
considers the relationship between compensation and efficiency 
in the context of the residency match. Part IV assesses the 
empirical evidence on resident compensation. Part V 
recommends that Congress preserve the antitrust exemption, but 
proposes additional regulations that would facilitate competition. 
Part VI concludes. 
II. MEDICAL EDUCATION AND THE MATCH 
To understand the conflict over the match, it is important to 
first understand the rigorous and lengthy formal training process 
that transforms college graduates into physicians. It begins with 
enrollment in medical school.29 While medical school curriculums 
vary, they generally include two years of basic science education 
in areas such as anatomy, biochemistry, and microbiology.30 This 
coursework is followed by two years of clinical rotations, during 
which students work with patients in supervised settings in 
practice areas such as internal medicine, psychiatry, and 
surgery.31 
The training required to become a fully licensed physician 
extends beyond the clinical exposure in medical school. Medical 
school graduates must first receive the more intensive training 
offered by residency programs, which focus on developing the 
clinical skills and detailed knowledge necessary to provide high-
quality medical care within a specialized field.32 Providing 
services to patients is an integral part of the educational 
process.33 The length of residency programs varies by specialty; 
internal medicine residencies last three years, while a basic 
                                                          
 28. Priest, supra note 26. 
 29. To prepare for medical school, college students generally take numerous basic 
sciences courses, including biology, chemistry, and physics. See Am. Med. Ass’n, Becoming 
an MD: How Do You Become a Physician?, http://www.ama-assn.org/ama/pub/category/ 
14365.html (last visited Oct. 1, 2005). Most medical schools consider Medical College 
Admission Test (MCAT) scores as part of the highly competitive admissions process; the 
MCAT tests proficiency in the biological and physical sciences, among other areas. See 
Ass’n of Am. Med. Colls., About the MCAT, http://www.aamc.org/students/mcat/about/ 
start.htm (last visited Oct. 1, 2005). 
 30. See Ass’n of Am. Med. Colls., Curriculum Directory, http://services.aamc.org/ 
currdir/about.cfm (last visited Oct. 1, 2005) (describing the medical education process). 
 31. Id. 
 32. AM. MED. ASS’N, GRADUATE MEDICAL EDUCATION DIRECTORY 9 (2003). 
 33. See id. at 10 (explaining that “[t]he education of resident physicians relies on an 
integration of didactic activity in a structured curriculum with diagnosis and 
management of patients”). 
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surgery program may last five years.34 Training within a 
subspecialty may extend physicians’ formal education process by 
several more years.35 A physician seeking specialized training in 
cardiology, for example, might first participate in an internal 
medicine residency program and then spend three years in a 
cardiovascular disease program.36 
Before physicians may practice independently, they must 
obtain a license from the state in which they intend to practice.37 
Standards for licensure vary by state, but generally include 
graduation from medical school, successful completion of an 
exam, and completion of at least one year of postgraduate 
training.38 Residents are therefore not generally permitted to 
practice independently at the beginning of their residencies, but 
they may become fully licensed before the end of their 
residencies.39 
Most residency positions are assigned through the residency 
match. In 2005, the match involved 3,813 programs offering 
24,012 positions, and 31,862 applicants, including 15,308 2005 
graduates of American medical schools.40 In their fourth year of 
                                                          
 34. Id. at 423 (charting the length of time required for various medical specialties 
and subspecialties). 
 35. Id.  
 36. Id. at 92 (general requirements for internal medicine subspecialties); id. at 97–
98 (specific requirements for residency education in cardiovascular disease); id. at 423 
(program lengths). 
 37. See, e.g., N.Y. State Educ. Dep’t, License Requirements, http://www.op.nysed. 
gov/medlic.htm (last visited Oct. 1, 2005) (“Any use of the title ‘Physician’ or practice of 
medicine within New York State requires licensure.”). 
 38. See, e.g., id. (describing New York’s requirements); N.D. State Bd. of Med. 
Exam’rs, Physician Licensure Requirements, http://www.ndbomex.com/MD_Req.htm (last 
visited Oct. 1, 2005) (listing North Dakota’s requirements). 
 39. While obtaining a license does not generally require successful completion of an 
entire residency program, obtaining board certification in a discipline does. Residencies in 
approved hospitals have been required by specialty boards since the 1930s. KENNETH M. 
LUDMERER, TIME TO HEAL: AMERICAN MEDICAL EDUCATION FROM THE TURN OF THE 
CENTURY TO THE ERA OF MANAGED CARE 87 (1999). These requirements continue today. 
For example, the American Board of Internal Medicine requires that physicians complete 
thirty-six months of training in an ACGME-accredited residency (or a residency 
accredited by specified Canadian organizations) to obtain certification. Am. Bd. of 
Internal Med., Certification Policies, Internal Medicine Policies, http://www.abim.org/cert/ 
policiesim.shtm (last visited Oct. 1, 2005). While board certification is not a requirement 
for licensure or for practice in a specific area, it may be relevant to a patient’s choice of 
provider, to a hospital’s decision about the scope of a physician’s practice within its 
facility, to an insurer’s decision about the makeup of its provider panel, or to an insurer’s 
decision about the provision of malpractice insurance. 
 40. NRMP, About the NRMP, http://www.nrmp.org/about_nrmp/index.html (last 
visited Oct. 1, 2005) [hereinafter NRMP, About the NRMP]. The match involves more 
than just fourth-year medical students and first-year residency positions. Match 
participants also include previous American medical school graduates seeking residency 
positions and physicians educated outside of American medical schools. NRMP, 
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medical school, students submit applications to residency 
programs. Most programs permit electronic submissions of 
applications and other supporting materials, including personal 
statements, recommendations, and transcripts, beginning in 
September.41 Programs invite selected applicants to on-site 
interviews, during which programs and students can collect more 
information about each other.42 Then, sometime in January or 
February, programs submit to the NRMP confidential ordered 
lists of their preferred applicants, and students submit 
confidential ordered lists of their preferred programs.43 There is 
no limit to the number of applicants or programs that may be 
listed.44 Match rules prohibit participants from making 
commitments prior to the match.45 
In March, a computer algorithm assigns matches of 
programs and students based on the rank-order lists that have 
been submitted.46 The algorithm begins by tentatively assigning 
an applicant to the applicant’s first choice program, if that 
program has listed the applicant and still has positions 
available.47 If the first choice program has not listed the 
applicant, the algorithm will attempt to assign the applicant to 
his or her second choice program.48 Similarly, if the first choice 
                                                          
Independent Applicants, http://www.nrmp.org/res_match/special_part/ind_app (last 
updated Aug. 2004). Also, some residency positions offer advanced training and are not 
open to first-year residents. See AM. MED. ASS’N, supra note 32, at 39 (discussing 
advanced training programs not available to first year residents in the field of 
anesthesiology).  
 41. AAMC, Electronic Residency Application Service, Timeline, Deadlines and 
Timing Issues, http://www.aamc.org/students/eras/timeline/start.htm (last visited Oct. 1, 
2005). 
 42. See NRMP, The Application Process, http://www.nrmp.org/res_match/about_res/ 
application_process.html (last visited Oct. 1, 2005) (referring to programs’ interview 
requirements). 
 43. See NRMP, Dates of NRMP Matches, http://www.nrmp.org/about_nrmp/ 
schedule.html (last visited Oct. 1, 2005) (listing the dates that rank-order lists open and 
close). The match also accommodates couples seeking to coordinate their position 
searches. See NRMP, U.S. Seniors: Couples, http://www.nrmp.org/res_match/special_part/ 
us_seniors/couples.html (last visited Oct. 1, 2005) (describing the couples search 
algorithm). 
 44. See Miller & Greaney, supra note 1, at 914 (explaining that up to fifteen 
preferences are included in the registration fee for applicants, and that applicants may 
rank additional preferences for thirty dollars per listing). 
 45. NRMP, supra note 19, § 6.0. 
 46. See NRMP, 2006 Main Match Schedule, http://www.nrmp.org/res_match/yearly. 
html (last visited Oct. 1, 2005) (indicating that match results will be posted on March 16, 
2006); NRMP, How the Matching Algorithm Works, http://www.nrmp.org/res_match/ 
about_res/algorithms.html (last visited Oct. 1, 2005) [hereinafter NRMP, How the 
Matching Algorithm Works] (explaining the matching algorithm). 
 47. NRMP, How the Matching Algorithm Works, supra note 46. 
 48. Id. 
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program has listed the applicant but the program is full and has 
ranked all of its tentatively matched candidates more highly 
than the applicant, the algorithm will attempt to assign the 
applicant to his or her second choice program.49 On the other 
hand, if the first choice program is full, but the program prefers 
the applicant to at least one of its tentatively matched 
candidates, the algorithm will tentatively assign the applicant to 
the program.50 To accommodate this tentative assignment, the 
algorithm will remove the program’s least-preferred tentatively 
assigned candidate.51 The algorithm will subsequently attempt to 
assign the dropped candidate to the next program on the dropped 
candidate’s list.52 Through this iterative temporary-assignment 
process, the algorithm ultimately ensures that each student is 
admitted to the program he or she prefers the most if it is not 
filled by students that the program prefers more. Students who 
are left unmatched at the end of this process may reapply the 
following year, or they may join the “Scramble” in which they 
apply for positions that have remained unfilled.53 
In 2005, about 94% of U.S. medical school seniors 
participating in the match were assigned successfully,54 the 
majority to their first-choice program.55 Applicants who are 
matched are required to join their assigned programs.56 It is this 
matching mechanism that is at the center of the antitrust 
complaint. 
III. IS THE MATCH ANTI- OR PROCOMPETITIVE? 
A. The Anticompetitive Match 
Although only recently challenged as a violation of antitrust 
law, the residency match has been a feature of the medical 
                                                          
 49. Id. 
 50. Id. 
 51. Id. 
 52. Id. 
 53. NRMP, Independent Applicants, http://www.nrmp.org/res_match/special_part/ 
ind_app/match_results.html (last visited October 1, 2005) (describing the “Scramble”). 
 54. Press Release, Nat’l Resident Matching Program, U.S. Medical School Seniors 
Apply to Residency Programs in Record Numbers (Mar. 17, 2005), available at http:// 
www.aamc.org/newsroom/pressrel/2005/050317.htm. 
 55. Among U.S. seniors who were matched, 62.5% received their first choice, 15.0% 
their second choice, and 8.7% their third choice. The remaining 13.8% were matched with 
their fourth-ranked program or lower. NRMP, Percent Matches by Rank Number, http:// 
www.aamc.org/newsroom/pressrel/2005/matchcharts.pdf (last visited Oct. 1, 2005). 
 56. See NRMP, supra note 19, § 5.1 (“Failure to honor this commitment by either 
party participating in a match will be a material breach of this Agreement . . . .”). 
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education system since 1951.57 The motivation for the adoption of 
the match is controversial. In their complaint, the plaintiffs 
allege that the match was intended to depress compensation in a 
market in which the demand for residents exceeded the supply.58 
Specifically, they allege that 
[i]n 1952, the hospitals and other entities employing 
resident physicians determined that the continuation of 
free competition in recruiting, hiring, employing and 
compensating resident physicians was undesirable because 
the number of available residency positions outpaced the 
number of available candidates. Employers determined that 
continued free competition would “bid up” compensation 
and other terms of employment by which employers 
commonly compete to attract employees. Creating the 
matching program enabled employers to obtain resident 
physicians without such a bidding war . . . .59 
In fact, the number of positions available to first-year 
medical school graduates exceeded the number of applicants from 
around the turn of the century, when postgraduate training was 
first introduced, until the mid-1970s.60 The number of positions 
continues to exceed the number of graduates from U.S. medical 
schools (although not the total number of applicants).61 In a 
competitive market, if demand exceeds supply of a good or 
service, the price would ordinarily rise, and supply would 
increase and demand would decrease, until the market 
equilibrated.62 The surplus in residency positions therefore would 
have placed upward pressure on the compensation offered to 
applicants. In theory, then, the match may have been an 
anticompetitive measure adopted in response to this pressure.63 
By imposing constraints on the competitive process, the 
residency match affects the nature of competition but does not 
                                                          
 57. Alvin E. Roth, The Evolution of the Labor Market for Medical Interns and 
Residents: A Case Study in Game Theory, 92 J. POL. ECON. 991, 992, 995–96 (1984). 
 58. Complaint, supra note 1, ¶ 84. 
 59. Id. 
 60. Roth, supra note 57, at 992–93 & 993 n.1. 
 61. See NRMP, About the NRMP, supra note 40 (reporting that in the 2005 match, 
15,308 2005 U.S. graduates and 16,554 independent applicants applied for 24,012 
positions). 
 62. See, e.g., PAUL A. SAMUELSON & WILLIAM D. NORDHAUS, ECONOMICS 55–61 (17th 
ed. 2001) (discussing the general principles of supply and demand). 
 63. The ratios of applicants to available positions likely differ depending on the 
nature of the position. To the extent that residency positions are imperfect substitutes for 
one another, an excess supply of one type of position would not necessarily place upward 
pressure on wages for another type of position. Programs with unfilled positions, however, 
would have reason to advocate the adoption of a mechanism that might allow them to 
obtain residents without having to increase compensation. 
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eliminate it. Under a match system, programs compete indirectly 
for residents by competing for high rank-orders. A program 
might try to increase its place in applicants’ rank-orderings by 
touting all of its positive attributes, including high compensation. 
Anecdotal evidence in fact suggests that programs have competed 
based on compensation in the post-match period.64 While match 
rules prohibiting the creation of pre-match contracts preclude a 
binding commitment to pay any particular level of compensation, 
programs may disclose intended future program characteristics 
to applicants.65 Students for whom compensation is important are 
therefore likely to obtain compensation information before the 
ranking process begins. It seems, then, that the main effect of the 
match would be to shift the competitive process from the 
employment offer stage to the rank-order stage. If this were the 
only effect, the match would impose no downward pressure on 
wages. 
On the other hand, the nature of competition within the 
match will not necessarily mirror the competition that would 
occur outside of a match system. Imagine a labor market in 
which skilled workers are in high demand. Imagine, furthermore, 
that there is some uncertainty about the quality of applicants. 
Some applicants will arrive with knowledge, skills, talents, and 
experience that allow them to generate significant surpluses 
(profits) for an employer through their efforts in the workplace; 
those of lesser ability will generate lower surpluses. Even 
candidates with similar educational backgrounds and formal 
training may differ widely in their productivity. Assessing this 
productivity is difficult and costly. 
                                                          
 64. See LUDMERER, supra note 39, at 193. 
Salary became a weapon in the efforts of teaching hospitals to recruit the best 
house officers, particularly when they were competing against hospitals in the 
same city or geographical region. . . . Jefferson Medical College, for instance, 
repeatedly raised its house staff pay scale in response to competition from the 
other Philadelphia teaching programs. Students and house officers reveled in 
this competition. . . . [T]hey made their desire for higher incomes known, and 
leaders of even the most prestigious programs had to listen. 
Id. (footnotes omitted). 
 65. In the past, NRMP rules precluded pre-match contracts but encouraged 
information disclosure. For example, the August 26, 2002 “Policies of the NRMP” states 
that “any verbal or written contracts prior to the submission of Rank Order Lists is [sic] a 
violation of the Match,” (policy 8.0) but that “programs are expected to provide complete 
and accurate information to interviewees, including a sample contract and institutional 
policies regarding eligibility for appointment to a residency position” (policy 6.2). Policies 
of the NRMP (2002) (on file with author). In 2003, the NRMP decided to require programs 
participating in the match to disclose before the rank-order list deadline the contract that 
successfully matched applicants would be expected to sign. Press Release, Nat’l Resident 
Matching Program, NRMP Requires Medical Residency Programs to Show Contracts to 
Applicants (Oct. 31, 2003), available at http://www.nrmp.org/contractpr.pdf. 
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In this setting, a job candidate may visit several potential 
employers. A potential employer evaluates the candidate’s 
credentials and decides to make an offer, say for $50,000, because 
it believes that the candidate can produce more than $50,000 in 
benefit for the employer. The existence of an offer that would be 
contractually binding if accepted communicates to other similarly 
situated employers that according to one assessment, the 
candidate would produce more than $50,000 in surplus. An 
employment offer with compensation attached is a signal of the 
candidate’s minimum quality. To the extent that the employers’ 
needs are similar, a competing employer could use this 
information as a baseline for making its own offer. It could use 
the existence of outside offers as a low-cost way of sorting more 
productive from less productive candidates, and then conduct a 
further assessment to determine whether the candidate would 
likely produce even more than $50,000 in surplus for its own 
organization. If so, it could make the candidate an offer of more 
than $50,000. The candidate could then return to the initial 
offeror, or move on to other potential employers, to solicit a still 
more lucrative offer. In an ordinary competitive labor market, 
workers can use offers from one potential employer to extract 
offers and higher compensation from competing potential 
employers.66 
In the residency match setting, residents cannot take full 
advantage of this type of bargaining in order to increase either 
the likelihood of competing offers or the amount of compensation, 
benefits, or other perks. Residents may certainly suggest to 
programs that their benefits packages are not as attractive as 
those of other programs, but they cannot negotiate with an 
employer from a position of strength based on a competing offer.67 
Programs participating in the match are not permitted to form a 
contract outside of the match for a position that is to be allocated 
                                                          
 66. In this scenario, later potential employers are able to free ride off of the initial 
potential employer’s investment in assessing the quality of the employee. Not only does 
the initial employer bear the full cost of that investment, but by making an offer it invites 
competition for the services of the employee. The initial employer could try to limit the 
employee’s ability to seek competing offers by holding the offer open for only a short time, 
but to prevent the free-riding problem the employer would have to find a way to prevent 
disclosure of the existence of the offer. The discussion of this scenario assumes that 
employers would not successfully do so. 
 67. Dr. Sanders Chae makes this point when he argues that “[w]ithout an offer in 
hand, students have no power to negotiate with the programs, and programs do not need 
to compete for residents through salary or other monetary benefits.” Chae, supra note 1, 
at 353. This passage overstates the case, however. To the extent that residents care about 
the immediate monetary benefits of a residency position, programs have an incentive to 
compete to attract high rankings from students they prefer. 
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through the match process.68 Nor are match participants 
permitted to solicit information about rank-orderings from one 
another.69 While it is permissible to volunteer ranking 
information,70 and it is conceivable that a program would make 
an offer prior to the match for a position included in the match, 
neither action would constitute a credible commitment. Positions 
are allocated based solely on rank-orderings actually submitted, 
not on rank-orderings compiled previously or other information.71 
Commitments become binding only after the match takes place.72 
As a result, any information provided before the match is suspect 
and cannot be used in the same way that formal offers are used 
in a more conventional workplace setting—to solicit an offer or 
improve on a compensation package. 
Although there is no formal sanction for deviating from a 
suggested rank-ordering or benefits package, reputational 
sanctions may discourage misleading representations.73 A 
program that widely advertises that it will offer a high level of 
compensation or adopt a particularly attractive feature, for 
example, might face a decline in applications from suspicious 
future applicants if it later reverses its decision. If reputational 
sanctions are effective, nonbinding commitments may be helpful 
to a candidate in the same way formal offers would be. 
Employment negotiations typically occur at the individual 
level, however, where reputational sanctions may be less 
effective. In fact, studies suggest that reputational sanctions (if 
any) have been unsuccessful in deterring misleading behavior 
                                                          
 68. NRMP, Match Participation Agreement for Institutions § 4.2, http://www.nrmp. 
org/res_match/policies/map_institution.html (last visited Oct. 1, 2005). 
 69. NRMP, supra note 19, § 6.0. 
 70. See id.  
 71. Section 8.0 of the NRMP’s Match Participation Agreement for Institutions reads 
in part as follows:  
It is a material breach of this Agreement and of the Match Participation 
Agreement . . . for a program that is participating in the Matching Program to make 
any verbal or written contract for appointment to a concurrent year residency 
position prior to the Matching Program. In addition, although applicants or 
programs may volunteer how they plan to rank each other, it is a material breach of 
this Agreement and of the Match Participation Agreement . . . to request such 
information. Only the final preferences of programs and applicants, as reflected in 
their final certified rank order lists, will determine the offering of positions and the 
placement of applicants through the Matching Program. 
 NRMP, supra note 68, § 8.0. 
 72. See NRMP, supra note 19, § 5.1 (noting that a binding commitment is 
established if a successful match results). 
 73. See id. § 4.3 (indicating that although “programs are expected to provide 
complete and accurate information to interviewees,” the “NRMP is not responsible for 
ensuring the accuracy of information exchanged between applicants and programs”). 
(4) MADISONG1 10/10/2005 2:52 PM 
2005] THE RESIDENCY MATCH 775 
that occurs within the context of the match. For example, over 
seventy percent of one survey’s respondents agreed with a 
statement that “[a]pplicants often make dishonest or misleading 
assurances or statements to programs about their level of 
interest.”74 Another survey-based study reports that more than 
ninety percent of family practice program directors believed that 
applicants had occasionally lied to them.75 Program directors may 
also engage in misleading behavior; the same family practice 
program survey found that while almost no directors would lie to 
candidates asking about the programs’ rankings of candidates, 
the majority would give only a vague response, and a significant 
number would give a “vague but positive response” to low-ranked 
applicants.76 In this setting, applicants would be unlikely to be 
able to use information about competing programs’ prospective 
rankings as an effective negotiation tool.77 
The implication of the match’s restrictions and the 
participants’ behavior is that there is little foundation for 
negotiation with individual candidates.78 An applicant cannot 
wait until a program makes an offer and then try to gain a larger 
percentage of the surplus created by the match through 
                                                          
 74. John Bernard Miller et al., Communication Between Programs and Applicants 
During Residency Selection: Effects of the Match on Medical Students’ Professional 
Development, 78 ACAD. MED. 403, 408 (2003). The majority of students also thought that 
misleading statements helped improve their position in the match, implying that they 
believed that program directors rely on their statements in some way despite their lack of 
credibility. Id. at 408 tbl.5. On the other hand, another study reported that over eighty 
percent of program directors were skeptical of or did not believe a candidate’s claim that 
the program was a highly ranked choice. Peter J. Carek et al., Recruitment Behavior and 
Program Directors: How Ethical Are Their Perspectives About the Match Process?, 32 FAM. 
MED. 258, 259 (2000). 
 75. Carek et al., supra note 74, at 259. 
 76. Id. at 259 tbl.1. When communicating with low-ranked applicants, 6.0% of 
program directors said they would respond honestly, 30.1% would give a vague but 
positive response, 23.2% would give a vague but negative response, 0.3% would lie, and 
40.5% would indicate that they were not permitted to share this information with the 
applicant. Id. 
 77. See Peter J. Carek & Kimberly D. Anderson, Residency Selection Process and 
the Match: Does Anyone Believe Anybody?, 285 JAMA 2784, 2784–85 (2001), for a 
discussion of ethics within the residency match. 
 78. On the other hand, it has been asserted that negotiations outside of the match 
nonetheless occur. One observer offers the following comments about the match: 
Here, we find a selection process riddled with backstage deals, negotiated perks, 
and signing bonuses (of $10,000 and up). With residency slots far exceeding the 
number of U.S. medical school graduates, programs battle to entice the “best and 
the brightest.” . . . Meanwhile, applicants are well aware that program directors 
fear “not filling” and therefore play programs off against each other to wrangle 
the “best deal.” 
Fred Hafferty, Finding Soul in a “Medical Profession of One,” 28 J. HEALTH POL. POL’Y & 
L. 133, 147 (2003) (book review) (citations omitted). 
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negotiations and a threat to go elsewhere. While competition will 
tend to keep compensation within a reasonable range—
applicants may avoid programs with histories or promises of poor 
compensation packages—applicants do not have the extra 
leverage that they would have in a conventional labor market 
characterized by unfettered, individualized competition among 
both future employers and future employees. Once the match is 
officially made, the resident is bound to accept the position at the 
offered salary.79 
Moreover, academic work focusing specifically on the 
question of matching and wages suggests that matching 
mechanisms similar in general form to the NRMP may be 
associated with lower wages. Ulrich Kamecke demonstrates this 
point with a theoretical model and concludes that “the 
competition for interns is not sufficient to force wages all the way 
up to their competitive level. In equilibrium the interns are in 
general worse off than in an ideal decentralized market.”80 The 
general intuition underlying this result is that when programs 
make their wage offers through the match, the stated wage only 
has to be sufficiently high that the candidate will rank that 
program more highly than his or her next best choice. In a 
competitive market, a candidate’s ability to seek employment 
with a competitor pressures the initial hospital to raise its wages, 
allowing the candidate to extract more of the surplus created 
through the employment relationship. Without this opportunity 
to negotiate, the resident’s pay is not as high as it otherwise 
would be.81 A recent working paper by Jeremy Bulow and 
Jonathan Levin using a different matching model finds that 
when programs do not make individualized salary offers, salaries 
will be lower than in a competitive equilibrium, particularly for 
the most sought-after residents.82 The features of these papers’ 
models do not conform precisely to those of the residency match, 
but the results suggest the effects the residency match may have 
on resident compensation. The models are discussed in more 
detail in subpart III.C.4 below. 
                                                          
 79. In addition, programs may solidify their bargaining position by not negotiating 
individually over salaries. Historically, the characteristics of the position (including duties 
and compensation) were specified in advance of the match, and were not subject to 
negotiation. Roth, supra note 57, at 995–96. 
 80. Ulrich Kamecke, Wage Formation in a Centralized Matching Market, 39 INT’L 
ECON. REV. 33, 34–35 (1998). 
 81. Id. at 42, 48. 
 82. Jeremy Bulow & Jonathan Levin, Matching and Price Competition 1–2 
(Stanford Univ., Working Paper No. 1818, 2003), available at http://www.stanford. 
edu/group/SITE/Levin.03.pdf. 
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B. The Procompetitive Match 
While some have argued that the match is anticompetitive, 
others have argued that the match is in fact procompetitive.83 
Advocates of the match, including the NRMP itself, cite as its 
chief advantage its beneficial effect on the timing of residency 
offers and acceptances.84 Professor Alvin Roth, an expert in the 
economics of matching mechanisms who assisted in a relatively 
recent redesign of the residency match, has written extensively 
about market timing questions.85 His academic work focuses not 
on compensation issues, but on the benefits that arise from 
channeling competition through a matching mechanism.86 
While the residency antitrust suit complaint argues that the 
motivation for adopting the match was relief from competition-
induced upward pressure on wages,87 Roth’s historical account of 
the catalyzing pressures focuses on the timing of offers and 
acceptances of residency positions.88 He explains that as a result 
                                                          
 83. For general descriptions of benefits of a matching system, see Miller & Greaney, 
supra note 1, at 915–16, and Creasman, supra note 1, at 1462–63. For a discussion of 
potential benefits (and drawbacks) of a formalized matching process in the context of the 
judicial clerkship market, see generally Christopher Avery, Christine Jolls, Richard A. 
Posner & Alvin E. Roth, The Market for Federal Judicial Law Clerks, 68 U. CHI. L. REV. 
793 (2001). 
 84. See NRMP, How the NRMP Process Works, http://www.nrmp.org/about_nrmp/ 
how.html (last visited Oct. 1, 2005) (“Because it provides a uniform date for decisions 
about residency selection for both applicants and programs, the NRMP matches eliminate 
the pressure that might otherwise fall upon applicants and programs to make decisions 
before all of their options are known.”). 
 85. Roth was hired in 1995 to redesign the residency matching system and to 
evaluate the redesign’s potential effects. See Al Roth’s Game Theory and Experimental 
Economics Page, http://kuznets.fas.harvard.edu/~aroth/alroth.html (last updated June 16, 
2005) (an excellent resource for information about matching). The main feature of this 
redesign was to move from a “program-proposing” algorithm to an “applicant-proposing” 
algorithm to address concerns that the algorithm was too favorable to programs and too 
susceptible to strategic manipulation. Roth’s study found that the effects of the 
subsequently adopted redesign would be small. See Alvin E. Roth & Elliott Peranson, The 
Redesign of the Matching Market for American Physicians: Some Engineering Aspects of 
Economic Design, 89 AM. ECON. REV. 748, 748, 754–55, 773 (1999). 
 86. See Al Roth’s Game Theory and Experimental Economics Page, supra note 85 
(listing Roth’s publications). 
 87. Complaint, supra note 1, ¶ 84. 
 88. Roth, supra note 57, at 992–97. Some medical school graduates of the era in 
which the match was adopted echo Roth’s account. In response to an article describing the 
antitrust issues raised by the match, W. Hardy Hendren writes, 
I graduated from medical school in 1952, the year the National Resident 
Matching Program was initiated. As a medical student, I spent five months 
working on the Match . . . .  
The Match was designed to assist medical students in choosing the best 
possible internship. 
W. Hardy Hendren, Letter to the Editor, 348 NEW ENG. J. MED. 2260, 2260 (2003). 
Another physician writes, 
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of competition (presumably the same competition over residents 
discussed by the plaintiffs in their complaint), the date of 
agreements between applicants and programs began to creep 
backward.89 Each program wanted to make sure it could obtain 
commitments just a bit before competitor programs.90 The effect 
of this creep, or “unraveling,” as Roth terms the phenomenon in 
other work on market transaction timing,91 was that offers were 
made at increasingly early points in medical school students’ 
education. By 1944, the standard appointment date had become 
the beginning of the student’s junior year, two years before the 
residency would begin.92 
This unraveling was problematic because it meant that both 
students and programs made decisions on the basis of 
information that they possessed at an early stage in the students’ 
education. Students who had completed two years of medical 
school may not have had much exposure to clinical practice, and 
may not have had much inclination about their own career 
preferences, which would influence their residency position 
choices. Residency programs, meanwhile, would have had limited 
student performance data, impeding their ability to target offers 
to the most qualified or appropriate candidates.93 Many efforts 
were made to coordinate appointment dates voluntarily, but they 
failed.94 The unraveling phenomenon and the difficulty of 
resolving it are likely familiar to lawyers, judges, and legal 
academics, who have experienced both in the market for federal 
judicial clerks.95 In the market for residents, the problem was 
                                                          
Physicians of my era (I attended medical school from 1948 to 1952) remember 
seeing senior students sleeping in phone booths waiting for a call from their 
first-choice hospital but having to respond to the rest of their choices by a 
deadline that was only days or hours away—typically, 72 hours. 
The Match was initiated in 1952 by my class, led by Hardy Hendren, now 
a professor emeritus at Harvard Medical School. The medical students—not the 
hospitals—arranged the Match. 
James A. Pittman, Jr., Letter to the Editor, 348 NEW ENG. J. MED. 2260, 2260 (2003) 
(footnote omitted). 
 89. Roth, supra note 57, at 993–94. 
 90. Id. at 993. 
 91. See Alvin E. Roth & Xiaolin Xing, Jumping the Gun: Imperfections and 
Institutions Related to the Timing of Market Transactions, 84 AM. ECON. REV. 992, 994 
(1994) (using the term “unraveling”). 
 92. Roth, supra note 57, at 994.  
 93. See, e.g., id. at 993 (noting that hospitals “had to appoint interns without 
knowing their final grades or class standings”). 
 94. Id. at 993–97.  
 95. For a description of the problems associated with early hiring in the clerkship 
market, including informational deficiencies, see Avery et al., supra note 83, at 801–04. 
Recent efforts by federal appellate judges to mitigate the unraveling problem through a 
hiring moratorium and an agreement to hire students no earlier than the fall of their 
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ultimately resolved when the AAMC adopted a proposal to refuse 
to release transcripts or reference letters before the end of a 
student’s junior year.96 
Another problem soon arose, however.97 A program 
(“Program B”) would make an offer to a candidate, but the 
candidate would not immediately accept it because the program 
was the candidate’s second choice. The candidate would instead 
wait until he heard from his first choice (“Program A”), while 
Program B continued to hold open his position. (Meanwhile, 
Program A may have been keeping the candidate waiting 
because it was holding open an offer for another candidate.) By 
holding open its offer in the hope that the candidate would 
eventually accept it, Program B may have sacrificed an 
opportunity to make an offer to a third candidate, who may have 
preferred to join Program B, but who accepted an offer from a 
third program out of the fear she would not get another offer. To 
avoid losing the opportunity to recruit other candidates, 
programs would want to hold open offers for as little time as 
possible. In 1949, for example, the AAMC proposed that offers 
should be made just after midnight on November 15, and should 
be held open at least until noon the same day.98 There was 
pressure for offers to be open for even less time.99 This exploding 
offer phenomenon, also historically present in the market for 
judicial clerks, is problematic because candidates who do not 
want to risk losing an offer may be forced to accept it even 
though a more desirable position might be offered 
subsequently.100 The phenomenon also may lead to early 
acceptances that are later withdrawn, causing considerable 
disruption for programs that believe they have a commitment 
satisfactory to all parties.101 
The match resolved both of these problems while preserving 
competition among both programs and students. If all 
participants commit to the match, the backwards-creep problem 
                                                          
third year of law school are documented at Summary of the Law Clerk Hiring Plan, http:// 
www.cadc.uscourts.gov/internet/lawclerk.nsf/Content/SUMMARY?OpenDocument (last 
visited Oct. 1, 2005). For an article comparing the judicial clerkship and residency 
markets, see Annette E. Clark, On Comparing Apples and Oranges: The Judicial Clerk 
Selection Process and the Medical Matching Model, 83 GEO. L.J. 1749 (1995). 
 96. Roth, supra note 57, at 994. 
 97. See id. at 994–95 (describing the exploding offer problem). 
 98. Id. at 995. 
 99. Id. 
 100. For a discussion of exploding offers within the law clerk market, see Avery et 
al., supra note 83, at 816–25. 
 101. Roth, supra note 57, at 994 (noting hospitals’ frustration when candidates 
revoked their acceptances). 
(4) MADISONG1 10/10/2005 2:52 PM 
780 HOUSTON LAW REVIEW [42:3 
is resolved because participants do not form binding contracts 
outside of the match. This means that binding commitments 
cannot be made before the spring of medical students’ senior 
year. The match resolves the exploding offer problem by using a 
mechanism that precludes the existence of such devices. Based 
on the parties’ expressed preferences, the matching algorithm 
generates a single offer that the future resident is bound to 
accept.102 The match thus places bounds on the competitive 
process, bounds that almost certainly alter the matches that are 
ultimately formed. The important question for participants is 
whether the results of this process are preferable to the results of 
unfettered competition. 
Historical data and information from similar markets, such 
as the market for law clerks, suggest that if competition were 
completely unconstrained, contracts would almost certainly be 
established earlier in students’ educations.103 Earlier in the 
competitive process, programs have less information about the 
true quality of students. They have limited information about the 
students’ abilities and no information about the improvement in 
those abilities over the course of the students’ training. 
Furthermore, while students may not lack information about 
programs, they may have limited information about their own 
preferences with respect to these programs, particularly if most 
of their experience has been in a classroom rather than clinical 
setting. In addition, other changes in students’ lives during their 
medical school years may alter their preferences with respect to 
program attributes (geography, for example). 
The participants’ lack of information means that the 
preferences they express at an early stage in the offer process 
may not match the underlying “true” preferences they would 
have in an environment with more information. If the residency 
match were held in the spring of a student’s second year of 
medical school, rather than in the spring of the fourth year, the 
results would be quite different. As more time passes, 
information accumulates, and the correspondence between 
expressed preferences and true preferences improves. The later a 
match is formed, the more likely its results will maximize 
participant satisfaction. All else equal (an important caveat, as 
discussed in subpart III.B.4 below), participants in the 
competitive process will prefer later decisions to earlier decisions. 
                                                          
 102. See supra Part II (describing the match process). 
 103. See Avery et al., supra note 83, at 805–06 (describing the “backward progression 
in the time of hiring federal judicial law clerks”). 
(4) MADISONG1 10/10/2005 2:52 PM 
2005] THE RESIDENCY MATCH 781 
The second way in which the match alters the results 
relative to the unconstrained competitive process also involves 
information failures. Imagine that competition over residencies, 
while otherwise unconstrained, is delayed until the students’ 
fourth year. At this point, programs are fully aware of student 
characteristics, and their own preferences with respect to those 
characteristics. Candidates are fully aware of program 
characteristics, and their own preferences with respect to those 
characteristics. Each participant in the process could thus 
generate a complete rank-ordered list of fully-informed 
preferences; the higher the ranking, the higher the participant’s 
satisfaction from the resulting match. Nonetheless, information 
in this market is still less than perfect. In particular, students 
are not ordinarily aware of programs’ preferences with respect to 
other students, or other students’ preferences with respect to 
programs. Programs are not ordinarily aware of students’ 
preferences with respect to other programs, or other programs’ 
preferences with respect to students. Participants are therefore 
not fully informed about the nature of the market, and more 
specifically, the likelihood that any particular offer will be made 
or accepted. 
Assume, for example, that a student prefers program A to 
program B, and program B to program C. If program B makes an 
exploding offer, the student may accept only because the student 
is not sufficiently familiar with A’s and other students’ 
preferences to determine whether A will eventually make him or 
her an offer. This situation need not occur if a matching 
mechanism is in operation. The match allows residents to 
indicate their preferences with respect to multiple states of the 
world: “I would love to join program A, but if no position is 
available at A, then I’d be happy to join program B, and if not B, 
then C.” A resident need not accept an offer from program B only 
because a deadline looms and the resident lacks information 
about the availability of positions at program A. The computer 
has access to complete information about all participants’ 
preferences, allowing it to satisfy them all simultaneously.104 The 
match therefore generates different results than the competitive 
process would in the absence of a match, not just because 
competition occurs later in the students’ education than it 
otherwise would, but also because it can make use of all 
information available in the market. 
                                                          
 104. See supra notes 46–53 and accompanying text (describing the matching 
algorithm). 
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The match produces different results from unconstrained 
competition by ensuring that participants can act upon more 
fully-informed preferences,105 and by precluding strategic 
behavior that takes advantage of information gaps. The match 
algorithm is designed to obtain “stable” matches that reflect 
participants’ preferences, as expressed in their rank-orderings.106 
If a match is stable, no candidate or program will be matched to 
an unacceptable partner. The match algorithm necessarily 
achieves this result because it considers only matches suggested 
by the participants’ rank-order lists; if no acceptable match is 
possible, the participant will remain unmatched.107 In addition, if 
a match is stable, there can be no scenario in which a program 
and a candidate would both prefer to be matched to each other 
rather than to the partner assigned to them by the computer. If a 
program and candidate did prefer each other to their assigned 
matches, they would have an incentive to deviate from the initial 
match, destabilizing it. Thus, for a matching program to be 
successful, the algorithm used must produce a stable match. 
Professor Roth has found that previous NRMP match outcomes 
were stable.108 
In other words, if the preferences as reflected in the rank-
orderings are taken as given, none of the participants could 
successfully “contract around” the results of the match. A 
resident soliciting programs higher on his or her list would find 
that none would be interested in accepting the resident, because 
they would already be filled with more desirable candidates. A 
program soliciting residents higher on its list would find none 
that would be interested in joining, because the residents had 
                                                          
 105. The presence of a matching mechanism may make candidates’ preferences less 
informed in one respect. In a standard market, job candidates may use the existence 
and/or timing of a firm offer to gauge a potential employer’s intensity of preference. See 
Priest, supra note 26, at 155–56 (discussing timing as an indicator of intensity of 
preference). Centralized matching mechanisms prevent this expression of intensity. If a 
candidate’s preference for a firm is ordinarily determined in part by the firm’s preference 
for a candidate, then a centralized matching mechanism deprives the candidate of 
relevant information. But see infra Part III.C.4 (arguing that offer timing is a poor signal 
of preference intensity). 
 106. In his work, Roth defines stability and analyzes the extent of its existence. See, 
e.g., Roth, supra note 57, at 998 (“A given outcome x is called unstable if some student or 
hospital receives an unacceptable assignment or if there exists a hospital program hi and 
student sj who each prefer the other to their assignment at x.”); id. at 1001 (finding the 
existence of a stable outcome). 
 107. See supra notes 46–53 and accompanying text (describing the matching 
algorithm). 
 108. Roth & Peranson, supra note 85, at 754. For a discussion of stability in simple 
matching mechanisms and more complex matching mechanisms such as the NRMP, see 
id. at 752–55. 
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already been accepted into programs they preferred. If 
participants’ preferences were fully informed, accurately stated, 
and static, there would be no way to reassign residents to 
programs after the match has occurred that would better satisfy 
the preferences of some participants, without making others 
worse off. Because the competitive process generates initial 
matches based on choices made with less than complete 
information, the same cannot be said for unconstrained 
competition. 
The match could be said to be procompetitive because it 
facilitates the acquisition of information in order to generate a 
result that market participants could not easily improve upon 
through mutual agreement. Because match participants’ 
preferences are related to the output of residency programs, 
matching mechanisms will ultimately help maximize this output, 
including resident training, patient care, and medical research.109 
C. Efficiency in Matching Markets: A Response to Professor 
Priest 
In a recently published article, Reexamining the Market for 
Judicial Clerks and Other Assortative Matching Markets, George 
Priest has challenged the theory that matching mechanisms 
benefit competition.110 The article provides a comprehensive 
analysis of unraveling markets and the effects of offer-timing 
restrictions on aggregate welfare.111 Priest offers two core insights 
about matching markets and the unraveling phenomenon. First, 
he explains that for the concept of unraveling to have coherence, 
the point at which a market “begins” must be identifiable.112 
Then, by definition, a market unravels when transactions take 
place before this time, or more specifically, before some perceived 
“optimal market beginning time.”113 But Priest takes issue with 
the notion that a market as a whole can have an optimal 
                                                          
 109. Avery and his co-authors point out that the quantity of social benefit produced 
by the matching system will depend on how the benefit is created. Specifically, if the 
benefit produced is simply an additive function of the inputs of match participants, the 
match will have no effect on the total quantity of benefit produced. On the other hand, if 
the benefit production function is multiplicative, then it is important that better-quality 
participants be matched to each other. See Avery et al., supra note 83, at 804. 
 110. Priest, supra note 26. 
 111. See generally id. The discussion infra focuses on the paper’s theory of market 
unraveling and its implications for the residency market. It thus sacrifices the nuance 
and detail of Priest’s re-analysis of the judicial clerk market, and omits mention of the 
clerkship-related evidence Priest uses to support his arguments. 
 112. Id. at 151. 
 113. Id. 
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beginning time.114 He explains that typically, we assume that 
market participants search for contracting partners as long as 
the marginal benefits of the search exceed its marginal costs.115 
Benefits of search include the improved matches made possible 
by superior information, while costs include the resources used to 
obtain that information. Each market participant makes its own 
decision about when to engage in a transaction, based on 
perceived costs and benefits. In this setting, it is not clear why 
unraveling should have any normative significance.116 
Second, Priest argues that the cause of unraveling is 
artificially-imposed constraints on the dimensions along which 
market participants can compete.117 Many markets might be said 
to have natural “beginnings,” yet no unraveling occurs.118 So what 
distinguishes these entry-level markets from markets for 
clerkships or residencies? Priest points out that for most jobs, 
current salaries, future salaries, working conditions, work 
stability, and other characteristics vary.119 Employers hoping to 
attract more workers, a particular type of worker, or specific 
individual workers would adjust these characteristics 
accordingly; employers signal their intensity of preference 
through the adjustments they make. But the market for federal 
judicial clerks is different: job conditions are similar, salaries 
fixed.120 Clerkships may vary substantially in terms of prestige, 
but again this characteristic is fixed, not negotiable.121 For this 
reason, Priest explains, a judge’s offer is by its nature a take-it-
or-leave-it offer.122 The only dimension along which judges can 
                                                          
 114. See id. at 149–53 (“As a general matter, the concept of an optimal beginning 
date of a market is an artifact . . . .”). 
 115. Id. at 151. 
 116. Id. at 151–52. 
 117. Id. at 153–56. Note, however, that an assertion that fixed compensation (or 
other terms) is necessary for markets to unravel is inconsistent with economic work that 
has examined equilibria in early contracting markets. Wing Suen considers a market in 
which the quality of firms is known, the quality of workers is initially unknown but later 
revealed, and workers are risk averse—not an unreasonable description of the residency 
market. He shows that early contracting may occur despite prices that reflect supply and 
demand. See Wing Suen, A Competitive Theory of Equilibrium and Disequilibrium 
Unravelling in Two-Sided Matching, 31 RAND J. ECON. 101, 101–05 (2000). 
 118. To illustrate, Priest cites Roth’s work finding little unraveling in entry-level 
markets for MBA recipients, despite the fact that they return to full-time work 
simultaneously after completing their degrees. Priest, supra note 26, at 153. 
 119. Id. at 153–54. 
 120. Id.  
 121. Id. at 154–55 (observing that “some judges stand out as ‘feeders’ to the Supreme 
Court,” but noting that the reputation and ability of a judge are fixed at the time of 
application). 
 122. Id. at 155. 
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compete is the timing of their offers.123 Judges signal the intensity 
of their preferences by making an offer before others make theirs, 
and thus “the timing of the offer becomes the currency” that 
clears the market.124 
Together, these arguments give reason to doubt that a 
computerized matching algorithm is advisable as a mechanism 
for equilibrating a market. First, unraveling is not necessarily 
problematic, as it results from individual decisions about the 
costs and benefits of further search, and there is no reason to 
presume that more opportunity to search is better. Applying this 
idea to the residency market, the notion that it is optimal for the 
residency match to occur during a student’s fourth year in 
medical school has no obvious economic basis. If individual 
programs and students jointly decide to form a match during the 
students’ third year, it is only because their benefits from doing 
so exceed their costs. Why should they be required to wait for the 
match? Second, any early offers in the residency market are 
caused by constraints on other negotiation dimensions. To the 
extent that programs refuse to negotiate concerning their 
characteristics, there is no guarantee that the market will 
equilibrate; timing of offers therefore becomes a basis for 
allocating residency positions. A prospective resident who wants 
an attractive position must take it early or risk its 
disappearance. 
While Priest’s article focuses on the market for judicial 
clerks, Priest discusses the market for residencies as an example 
of a market subject to unraveling.125 He presents Roth’s 
description of the early-offer and exploding-offer problems as 
                                                          
 123. Id. (explaining that the judge cannot adjust a clerk’s salary, change the job 
description, or alter working conditions, but the judge can control the timing of the 
clerkship offer). 
 124. Id. at 156. See also id. at 153–56, for the full version of the argument outlined 
here; and id. at 182–99, for a broader presentation of the argument and an application to 
a variety of markets in which unraveling has been alleged to occur. In this section of his 
article, Priest argues that 
there are two separate phenomena to which Professor Roth’s work has alerted us 
that explain virtually all of his examples of true unraveling. One is a market 
phenomenon; the second, a regulatory phenomenon. They are related because 
they both involve constraints in some form on the operation of market forces. 
The first and, I believe the most interesting, phenomena in the Roth 
examples are markets in which time-of-offer is employed as a currency in the 
market transactions themselves. . . . 
The second phenomenon . . . derives from market 
regulation. . . . [Specifically, it derives from efforts to evade regulations that] 
constrain transactions to some “optimal” time.  
Id. at 183–84. 
 125. Id. at 187–90. 
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they existed in the 1940s, notes the adoption of the match as a 
solution, and shows that in 2001, the range of compensation paid 
to medical school graduates was much smaller than the range for 
law school graduates.126 He concludes that this difference 
suggests an explanation for why time-of-offer becomes important 
for medical school graduates, but not for law school graduates.127 
Modern salary information is perhaps not the best source of 
evidence for a theory linking constrained terms to early offers, 
however. While the salary information might indicate a 
constraint on terms, there is no evidence of early-offer 
competition in the modern era, simply because the match would 
preclude it. However, it is possible that salaries were as 
compressed in the 1940s as today, and that it was this 
compression that led to the spate of early offers that could be 
eliminated only by the match. (Note that a finding that salaries 
were as compressed in the 1940s as they are today would tend to 
refute the plaintiffs’ arguments that the match itself has caused 
salary compression. Instead, any compression would have 
resulted from some other type of constraint present both in the 
1940s and today.) 
Regardless of whether recent residency stipends offer 
support for Priest’s theory, Priest’s general insights on matching 
markets could apply to the residency market. Priest’s paper 
concludes that restrictions on the terms of trade (such as salary) 
lead to the use of time-of-offer to clear markets, that the use of 
time-of-offer as a market-clearing mechanism rewards those who 
can recognize talent on the basis of limited information, and 
finally that the “introduction of restrictions on the time-of-offer 
currency, like any other restriction on terms of trade, will change 
the allocative outcomes of the market . . . but can generally be 
predicted to reduce aggregate welfare.”128 In the context of the 
residency market, this logic would suggest that constraints on 
negotiations over residency benefits lead to unraveling, that 
unraveling rewards those who make the best use of information 
available early in the process, and that the introduction of the 
timing restrictions inherent in the match changes the program-
resident matching process and outcomes in such a way that 
aggregate welfare is reduced. 
It is important to evaluate Priest’s analysis because it 
implies that there is reason to doubt the procompetitive benefits 
touted by match advocates. While match supporters typically 
                                                          
 126. Id. 
 127. Id. at 190. 
 128. Id. at 203–04. 
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claim that matching mechanisms are efficient because they 
reduce mismatches, Priest argues that an efficiency analysis 
focusing on mismatches is incomplete in three ways.129 First, 
unraveling is not properly characterized as a prisoner’s dilemma; 
it is not the case that everyone gains through a coordinated 
matching mechanism.130 Second, it is important to take into 
account the costs and benefits of information acquisition; given 
the costs of information gathering, it is not necessarily the case 
that more is better.131 Finally, the finding of match-related 
welfare improvement is based on ordinal matches, and ordinal 
matches do not take into account differences in intensity of 
preferences that would ordinarily be reflected in differences in 
the terms of trade.132 Each of these three arguments offers an 
important insight, but as the below analysis demonstrates, none 
necessarily leads to the conclusion that the residency match 
impedes efficiency. 
1. Does the Match Solve a Prisoner’s Dilemma? Roth has 
characterized the early-competition problem as a prisoner’s 
dilemma.133 In the classic prisoner’s dilemma, the prisoners’ 
payoffs are structured such that making individually rational 
decisions (to confess) will generate a poor equilibrium outcome 
for both prisoners.134 Coordination (through an agreement not to 
confess) will generate improved outcomes for each relative to the 
poor equilibrium outcome.135 If the relevant benchmark is the 
benefit to the prisoners, coordination generates a more efficient 
result than decentralized rational decisionmaking: each is better 
off. If early competition is structured as a prisoner’s dilemma, in 
which all programs and students are made better off by delaying 
decisionmaking, then mechanisms that delay decisionmaking 
will increase aggregate welfare. If the match solves a prisoner’s 
dilemma, then it necessarily improves the welfare of match 
participants. 
In Priest’s view, however, the prisoner’s dilemma label is 
inappropriate because some participants may not become better 
off through coordination.136 Because the judges that make the 
                                                          
 129. Id. at 159–61. This Article considers Priest’s arguments in reverse order. 
 130. Id. at 161. 
 131. Id. at 159–61. 
 132. Id. at 159. 
 133. Roth, supra note 57, at 992. 
 134. THE MIT DICTIONARY OF MODERN ECONOMICS 344 (David W. Pearce ed., 4th ed. 
1992). 
 135. See id.  
 136. Priest, supra note 26, at 161. 
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earliest offers benefit from the unraveling and would lose from 
coordination, the game that judges play cannot properly be 
characterized as a prisoner’s dilemma. If some participants gain 
from coordination while others lose, then the only way to assess 
whether a matching mechanism has improved welfare is to find 
some way to measure the aggregate welfare of all involved, 
trading off one judge’s gain against another’s loss. The aggregate 
efficiency improvement from the forced delay is no longer so 
clear.137 
This assessment can be made more complete by 
differentiating between the two effects of matching mechanisms. 
One effect is to delay all decisions. Because more information 
about quality and preferences is available later, all else equal, 
the majority of market participants will prefer to delay their 
decisions. So, for example, most students and programs would 
likely prefer to schedule the NRMP in students’ fourth year in 
medical school, as it is now scheduled, to scheduling the NRMP 
in students’ second year in medical school. In this sense, 
coordination that delays the formation of matches does make 
everyone better off. The judge that makes the first offer in 
January of an unraveling market would prefer to make the first 
offer in June; the judge that makes the second offer would rather 
make that offer in July than in February. 
But the second effect of a matching mechanism, relative to 
an uncoordinated market, is to alter the way in which matches 
are formed. While an early-offer judge may rather make an offer 
in June than in January, that judge may not want to participate 
in such a system if it also means that the judge can no longer 
make the first offer. An early-offer judge takes strategic 
advantage of the fact that participants are uncertain about the 
likelihood of other matches to improve the judge’s payoff from the 
match. A matching mechanism forces the judge to sacrifice the 
strategic advantage associated with moving early, and this loss 
may exceed the gain from delaying the choice process. As a 
result, the early-offer judge may not prefer the matching 
mechanism outcome. Priest is thus correct to note that 
coordination does not necessarily benefit all participants.138 
                                                          
 137. For this reason, Avery and his co-authors note that the concept of Pareto 
efficiency (which exists when “there is no way to make one or more parties better off 
without making at least one person worse off”) is not particularly useful in evaluating the 
functioning of the judicial clerk market. Avery et al., supra note 83, at 800. They suggest 
as a potential alternative method examining the “‘sum total of satisfaction’” of clerks and 
judges. See id. at 800–04. 
 138. Priest, supra note 26, at 161 (finding that coordination does not benefit all; for 
example, less-favored judges or applicants might benefit from the early-offer market). 
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The degree to which this observation distinguishes the 
clerkship setting (or residency setting) from the prisoner’s 
dilemma setting turns on the characterization of the 
counterfactual. It is true that individual judges prefer the result 
where they make offers before other judges to the result where 
all judges make offers at the same time.139 But it is also true that 
prisoners prefer the result where they confess and their 
counterparts do not to the result of the coordinated game in 
which neither confesses.140 In the simple version of the prisoner’s 
dilemma, however, the outcome where one prisoner confesses and 
the other does not is not an equilibrium outcome. Because each 
prisoner would like to be the confessing one, the result is that 
both will confess, unless they both agree not to. It is for this 
reason that coordination improves the welfare of both. The 
reason that coordination does not benefit all judges is that the 
counterfactual is in effect a dis-equilibrium outcome, one in 
which one of the judges moves first. Each judge would like to 
move first, but the judges’ choices are not dichotomous. The game 
is not one in which a judge can choose to be “first” or “last” in the 
same way that a prisoner can choose to “confess” or “not confess”; 
instead, the judge must choose an offer time along a continuous 
timeline. The result is likely that rather than all of the judges 
making offers “first,” as in the prisoner’s dilemma—the worst 
possible outcome in that the judges both sacrifice information 
and fail to gain an advantage over competitors—the judges’ offers 
spread out along the timeline. The strategy that produces this 
spread resembles the one involved in the prisoner’s dilemma, 
even if the outcome does not. A second result of this game is 
unraveling, which occurs when offer dates creep backward as 
judges annually update their predictions about when they must 
move in order to move first. 
If the spread along the timeline were a product only of an 
annual guessing game, then the distribution of gains and losses 
associated with relative offer timing would be more a matter of 
chance than of choice. Judges would expect to gain little from the 
operation of such a mechanism, and lose much, due to the 
decreasing availability of information as timing creeps backward. 
They, like the confessing prisoners, would have reason to 
advocate for the adoption of a coordinated mechanism. 
                                                          
 139. See id. (noting that judges who extend early offers maximize their individual 
interests, and are better off as a consequence). 
 140. See THE MIT DICTIONARY OF MODERN ECONOMICS, supra note 134, at 344 (“The 
incentive here, for the rational [prisoner], concerned only with his own survival, is to 
confess and let the others suffer the consequences.”). 
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Judges’ relative positions along the timeline may be 
determined by more than just chance, however. As Priest 
recognizes, judges’ preferences over offer timing depend on a 
variety of factors.141 Potential factors that might influence offer 
timing include the judge’s ability to predict the quality of 
candidates and the judge’s disutility from selecting poor 
candidates. A judge particularly talented at selecting candidates 
based on little information, for example, will be more likely to 
make offers that fall on the early-offer end of the timeline. 
Because this judge need not benefit from a coordinated matching 
mechanism, competition among judges (or residency programs) 
does not necessarily take the form of a prisoner’s dilemma. That 
some judges benefit disproportionately from early-offer 
competition, however, does not mean that such competition is 
efficiency-enhancing relative to competition within a matching 
system. The losses to other judges may equal or exceed the gains 
to these judges. The only way to evaluate the efficiency question 
is to investigate more carefully the nature of the early-offer 
competition. 
2. Do Early Offers Obtain Distributive or Productive Gains? 
After rejecting the prisoner’s dilemma analogy, Priest turns to a 
different analogy, one comparing a judge to a prospector who 
buys mineral-rich land.142 The availability of an early-offer 
strategy encourages “judges to invest in techniques of prediction” 
to improve their matches, just as the possibility of profits 
encourages potential buyers to invest in the development of 
“specialized knowledge . . . to acquire a valuable object in 
advance of the revelation of its value to the wider set of market 
participants.”143 If we believe that markets are generally efficient, 
and that the market for land containing minerals is typical of 
efficient markets, then the implication of this analogy is that 
perhaps markets characterized by early offers are efficient too. 
But there are important differences between unraveling markets 
and markets for real estate that suggest that this analogy is 
problematic. 
Unraveling markets are often characterized by the existence 
of some date before which the transaction—trade of a commodity, 
                                                          
 141. See, e.g., Priest, supra note 26, at 161, 163 (suggesting that less-favored judges 
and less prominent judges may be willing to make early offers); id. at 151 (explaining that 
market timing will be determined in part by search costs, including “the value of time, the 
costs of obtaining information” and “the level of risk aversion deriving from expected 
uncertainty”).  
 142. Id. at 162. 
 143. Id. 
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provision of a service, formation of a relationship—cannot 
begin.144 In the case of residencies, this date is naturally 
determined by the completion of students’ medical school 
education. Full-time residencies that build on students’ full-time 
medical school training cannot possibly begin before medical 
school is complete.145 As a result, the benefit produced by the 
match cannot be realized until the residency actually begins. 
Market efficiency is a function of this benefit. It is true that a 
market for mineral-rich real estate rewards the first person to 
recognize its value,146 and that this reward helps to achieve 
market efficiency. But in this sort of market, the benefit starts 
accruing immediately after the “match” is made. From an 
efficiency perspective, it is better to identify the value of land 
earlier rather than later, because the owner can immediately 
extract the minerals, or inform the world of their presence and 
resell the land to someone who can. The more quickly 
information is discovered, the more quickly prices adjust, and the 
more quickly resources can be allocated to their most efficient 
use. Markets for law clerks and residents do not share this 
characteristic. Whether the match is made two years prior to the 
beginning of the position (on the basis of predictive powers) or 
one year prior to the beginning of the position (on the basis of 
transcript information), no benefit can accrue until the training 
actually begins. There is no efficiency justification for rewarding 
first movers solely because they are first.147 
This distinction has been captured in analysis of the contract 
law doctrine of unilateral mistake. Robert Cooter and Thomas 
Ulen argue, for example, that when information is “productive” 
and acquired by investment, a mistake defense based on the 
failure to acquire this information should be rejected and the 
contract enforced.148 They cite “information that farmland 
contains valuable mineral resources” as an example of productive 
information, and note that “[e]fficiency demands giving people 
strong incentives to discover productive facts.”149 Those who 
                                                          
 144. See id. at 151 (noting that many of the markets studied by Professor Roth “can 
be defined as ‘beginning’ at particular moments”). 
 145. See id. (observing that “entry-level employment markets can be defined as 
‘beginning’ only after the moment of graduation from a high school, college, or 
professional school”). 
 146. See id. at 162 (noting that early investors are rewarded). 
 147. If the timing of offers and acceptances is highly correlated with the strength of 
market participants’ partner preferences, and early offers produce matches that would 
not otherwise be formed, then there may be an efficiency benefit from early-offer 
competition. This possibility is discussed (and discounted) in subpart III.C.4 infra. 
 148. ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAW AND ECONOMICS 282–83 (4th ed. 2004). 
 149. Id. at 281–82. 
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invest in discovery of minerals should be allowed to profit from 
their investments; those who do not invest should not be 
permitted to profit from the discoveries of those who do. 
But Cooter and Ulen also identify a category of 
“redistributive information,” which “creates a bargaining 
advantage that can be used to redistribute wealth in favor of the 
informed party.”150 A judge who expends resources in assessing 
candidate quality for the sole purpose of determining whether to 
make an early offer (i.e., to redistribute wealth from a later judge 
to him or herself) is investing in redistributive information. 
Cooter and Ulen point out that investment in redistributive 
information is wasteful, and further explain that it “induces 
defensive expenditures by people trying not to lose their wealth 
to better-informed people.”151 If one judge invests in making the 
predictions that are necessary for early offers, other judges must 
make similar investments so that they too can make early offers 
and thus avoid a loss of wealth to the first-mover judge. 
It might be argued that investments in assessing quality are 
productive, as well as redistributive, because they allow higher-
quality matches to be formed. From this perspective, investment 
should be encouraged. However, the information that is produced 
in an unraveling market is produced quite inefficiently. A 
program that must predict the quality of a resident two years 
into medical school must invest substantially more resources in 
that prediction than a program that predicts the quality of a 
resident two years later, because it must develop predictive 
models based on information that may be only indirectly 
connected with future performance.152 In contrast, a program 
making a later prediction can acquire more directly applicable 
information cheaply, because it is produced nearly without cost 
as a byproduct of the educational process (in the form of grades, 
for example). Because investment costs are likely a declining 
function of time, all else equal, a matching process that occurs 
later will be more efficient than a process that occurs earlier.153 
                                                          
 150. Id. at 282. 
 151. Id. 
 152. Cf. Tom Ginsburg & Jeffrey A. Wolf, The Market for Elite Law Firm Associates, 
31 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 909, 936 (2004) (arguing that “[b]ecause law firms hire when 
candidates have so little tangible, relevant information to provide, firms must spend more 
time in interviews to gather information”). Ginsburg and Wolf analyze the market for law 
firm associates, including its unraveling tendencies and the potential explanations for the 
failure to implement a centralized matching mechanism. See id. at 936–63. 
 153. The arguments about information presume that the information will be useful. 
One study has concluded that medical school grades and exam performance did not 
predict residency clinical performance. Stephen M. Borowitz, et al., Information Collected 
During the Residency Match Process Does Not Predict Clinical Performance, 154 
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Given that the time at which a specific piece of information is 
produced or collected has no bearing on its usefulness in 
assessing match quality, the main reason to make a costly 
investment in predictions rather than waiting for information to 
be revealed is to redistribute wealth from competing judges to 
oneself. 
The idea that investment in acquiring soon-to-be naturally 
revealed information should be discouraged has also been 
explored in the context of contract law. Melvin Eisenberg argues 
that gains from acquiring “foreknowledge,” defined as 
“knowledge that ‘will, in due time, be evident to all,’” are often 
redistributive, and that the cost of acquiring such knowledge 
exceeds its social value.154 He concludes that the law should not 
provide incentives for acquiring foreknowledge.155 When a judge 
(or residency program) tries to predict qualities that will be 
naturally revealed as a candidate acquires more experience 
inside or outside of the classroom, the judge (or program) invests 
in foreknowledge. The acquisition of such information is likely 
inefficient, and the match eliminates this inefficiency by 
eliminating the reward for it (the pairing that would result from 
the early offer). 
Priest acknowledges that the distributional gains associated 
with being the first to capture a limited resource may provide an 
incentive for socially excessive investment, but argues that this 
concern does not apply in the clerkship or resident contexts.156 He 
explains that socially excessive investment arises when the 
resource’s value remains constant over time, but “the value of the 
resource to the judge”—presumably, the value of the clerk—
changes over time.157 As explained previously, however, the 
benefit to the judge (or residency program) of matching with a 
particular candidate is not a function of the timing of match 
formation; it is purely a function of the productivity of the 
                                                          
ARCHIVES PEDIATRICS & ADOLESCENT MED. 256, 256 (2000). While these results do cast 
some doubt on match supporters’ arguments, they do not undermine them. First, the 
study finds a correlation between performance and having been ranked in the top ten of 
the match list. Id. Second, the study is limited to sixty-nine residents in a single residency 
program, and may not be representative of the experience elsewhere. Id. Third, programs’ 
preferences (and hence rankings) may take into account factors other than clinical 
performance. Finally, even if programs cannot effectively make use of the additional 
information gained through a later match process, students may. 
 154. Melvin A. Eisenberg, Disclosure in Contract Law, 91 CAL. L. REV. 1645, 1664–65 
(2003) (quoting Jack Hirshleifer, The Private and Social Value of Information and the 
Reward to Inventive Activity, 61 AM. ECON. REV. 561, 562 (1971)). 
 155. Id. at 1665. 
 156. Priest, supra note 26, at 160. 
 157. Id. 
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relationship once the relationship begins. Judges make early 
offers not to ensure that a given clerk or group of clerks will 
produce more than they otherwise would, but to ensure that the 
benefit of the clerk’s fixed productivity accrues to them—a 
distributional gain, rather than a productive one.158 
While the benefit associated with hiring any given clerk or 
resident does not change over time, the cost of hiring the clerk 
may. But given that additional information about prospective 
clerks is naturally revealed as time progresses, the costs 
associated with hiring may actually decrease over time, 
suggesting that it is more efficient to hire clerks later than 
earlier.159 In fact, the declining-cost nature of information in the 
market for clerks or residents is another factor that distinguishes 
these markets from the market for mineral-rich land. In the 
market for mineral rights, the cost of information acquisition 
may decrease over time because technology improves or because 
someone may eventually stumble across a tell-tale sign of the 
presence of minerals. But for the most part, there is no reason to 
believe that there is a particular advantage to waiting a few 
years to investigate the quality of land. 
In his analysis of timing decisions, Priest emphasizes a 
different type of cost, the cost of “foregoing the opportunity of 
securing the clerk because of intervening rival offers.”160 From an 
individual market participant’s perspective, the cost of foregone 
opportunities is indeed a very real cost of delay, one that plays an 
                                                          
 158. If the value of a given clerk does not change across time, is there anything else 
that does? Priest points to two possible considerations: the costs of the search process, 
which are discussed in the next paragraph and in subpart III.C.4, and “those costs 
associated with the effect of the passage of time on the expected value of those applicants 
remaining in the market.” Id. If early-offer judges correctly select the most productive 
candidates, they leave a less-productive pool of candidates behind. This is one of the 
“costs” associated with waiting to make an offer. But this cost is no different from that 
faced by a real estate investor who fails to identify a valuable property before a competing 
investor purchases it; the investor then is left with only less valuable properties to 
purchase. This cost stems from the limited availability of the resource in question (the 
most valuable properties), and is the same cost that generates socially inefficient 
overinvestment. The declining-quality phenomenon does not make early offers socially 
productive; on the contrary, it is the basis for the distributive gain that provides the 
incentive for early offers. 
 159. It is true, as Priest argues, that it is not always beneficial to acquire more 
information; it may be desirable, for example, to make an offer before all interviews are 
complete. Id. at 166 (arguing that canceling an interview or extending an early offer in an 
effort to minimize costs is not inefficient). For instance, if an interview costs $100, and the 
second applicant is at most $50 better or worse than the first applicant, it is more efficient 
to make an offer to either candidate immediately than to interview the second one. But 
when information can be obtained at almost no economic cost purely through delay, an 
efficient system would facilitate delay.  
 160. Id. at 157. 
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important role in the participant’s cost-benefit analysis of when 
to make or to accept an offer.161 A rational participant would 
certainly take this cost into account. These opportunity costs 
differ from those of information acquisition, however, because 
they do not necessarily represent real economic costs to society.162 
They do not involve the consumption of resources, and so would 
not be part of an assessment of the overall economic efficiency of 
the matching process. Their only impact on efficiency would be 
through an indirect route; they affect the nature of the offers and 
acceptances that are made, thereby affecting the quality of the 
resulting matches. The scarcity of information that exists when 
early offers are made gives reason to doubt that these offers 
would generate a superior match. 
3. Does Inefficiency Arise from Ordinal Ranking in the 
Match? Priest’s third argument, however, does suggest a way in 
which early-offer competition might generate a superior result to 
the residency match. He argues that it is inappropriate to infer 
efficiency based on ordinal, rather than cardinal, expressions of 
preferences.163 By relying entirely on ordinal rankings of 
preferences, the residency match may achieve inefficient 
results.164 Participants in the medical residency match indicate 
their first and second choices, but do not disclose how much more 
they value their first choice than their second.165 Nor is there any 
basis for determining the extent to which one program’s 
preference for its top-ranked candidate exceeds a second 
program’s preference for its top-ranked candidate.166 
Imagine the following scenario: Program A would generate 
$6 in surplus from candidate Y, and $4 from candidate Z. 
Program B would generate $5 from a match with Y, and $1 from 
a match with Z. Both programs would therefore rank Y first and 
Z second. Imagine that both candidates would generate $2 in 
surplus if matched with A, and $1 if matched with B; both would 
therefore rank program A first and B second. Assume further 
                                                          
 161. See id. (noting that the value of delaying an offer to a “candidate may well be 
less than the cost incurred by delaying the offer”). 
 162. Priest implicitly acknowledges this point later in the article, when he argues 
that those who fail to get their preferred match because of early offers “may claim that a 
‘cost’ has been imposed upon them, but it is not a cost that in a competitive economy 
commands normative significance.” Id. at 162.  
 163. See id. at 159 (noting that the residency match relies on ordinal rankings that 
fail to account for differences in intensity of preferences); id. at 174 (arguing that “ordinal 
maximization does not guarantee the maximization of aggregate preferences”).  
 164. Id. at 174. 
 165. See supra notes 46–53 and accompanying text (describing the match algorithm). 
 166. Priest, supra note 26, at 159. 
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that there is no way for any match participant to reallocate a 
portion of its surplus to another. If each program had one 
residency position available, the residency match algorithm 
would assign candidate Y to program A, and candidate Z to 
program B, generating $10 in total surplus ($6 for A, $2 for Y, $1 
for B, $1 for Z). But this is not the maximum surplus possible. If 
the program had assigned Z to program A and Y to program B, 
$12 would have been created ($4 for A, $1 for Y, $5 for B, $2 for 
Z). Note that this result does not contradict the earlier 
observation that the residency match algorithm produces a stable 
match. Because program A would be uninterested in forming a 
match with Z (given that it has Y), and Y would be uninterested 
in forming a match with B (given that it has A), any effort to 
rearrange the results of the match under the given assumptions 
would be unsuccessful. And yet, all of the participants would be 
collectively better off—the match result would be more efficient—
if the match had worked the other way around. 
One way to alter this result is to permit the reallocation of 
surplus through a Coasian side deal.167 So, for example, if 
program B sweetened the surplus its residents would get by 
offering a $3 bonus, Y would have ranked program B first, and 
the algorithm would have assigned Z to A and Y to B and 
generated the $12 surplus ($4 for A, $4 for Y, $2 for B, $2 for Z). 
Alternatively, after the match has been made, B would be willing 
to pay A and Y to switch partners. Paying A $2.25 and Y $1.25, 
for example, would improve B’s welfare by 50 cents, Z’s welfare 
by $1, and the welfare of both A and Y by 25 cents each, resulting 
in an aggregate gain of $2. If the match generates inefficient 
results, the parties have an incentive to renegotiate. But if the 
match is based strictly on ordinal rankings, the only way this 
match reallocation can occur is if the parties are allowed to 
express their preferences through payments of bonuses or bribes. 
To the extent that Priest is correct in asserting that one 
characteristic of markets with a tendency to unravel is 
 
                                                          
 167. SAMUELSON & NORDHAUS, supra note 62, at 379. The Coase theorem suggests 
that “[w]here property rights are well defined and transaction costs are low, the affected 
parties can get together and negotiate an efficient solution.” Id. 
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inflexibility in the terms of trade (a questionable assertion),168 
then this efficiency-enhancing reassignment cannot occur.169 
Thus, the degree of inefficiency arising from an ordinal 
match depends both on the initial preferences of the participants 
and the extent to which reallocation of surplus is possible. If 
programs are all of the same quality, and students are all of the 
same quality, and the participants’ benefits from the match 
depend only on quality, then any assigned pairing would be 
efficient. (But of course, in this case there would be no need for a 
match in the first place.) This is an unlikely description of the 
conditions surrounding the residency match. Still unlikely, but 
less so, is that programs differ in quality, and candidates differ in 
quality, but a given program produces the same benefit for all 
candidates, and a given candidate produces the same benefit for 
all programs. If the numbers of the above example were altered 
to reflect preferences based on these assumptions, the match 
algorithm should generate the efficient result without any need 
for reallocation of surplus. In order for the ordinal preference-
based rankings to be problematic in the above example, there 
                                                          
 168. While constraints on terms of trade may contribute to unraveling, they may not 
be a precondition of unraveling. See supra note 117. Constraints on terms will almost 
certainly affect market equilibria. If compensation is artificially constrained, for example, 
it will not reflect the scarcity of positions (or of candidates) with desirable attributes. 
Participants cannot make up for deficiencies in their attributes by offering a higher wage 
or accepting a lower one. But even if compensation is unconstrained, it may not lead to 
equilibrium in markets characterized by scarcity, incomplete information, and an 
inability to renegotiate. From a residency program’s perspective, for example, only a few 
candidates have completed the educational prerequisites necessary to fill a position, and 
only a subset of this group is likely to have the attributes the program seeks. If program A 
could lure away a candidate at any time from program B by offering better terms, and if 
transaction costs barred program B from seeking compensatory damages for the 
candidate’s departure, there would be little gain to program B from making an early 
match. The unraveling problem arises when that initial match is binding and decisions 
are made without full information about others’ preferences; these characteristics help to 
create the strategic incentives to move early. Even if a candidate can negotiate terms with 
the first program that makes her an offer, the program has an incentive to make an offer 
early so that she cannot be enticed away by a better offer later. It is the constraints on 
renegotiation, then, that contribute to the unraveling problem. The plaintiffs in the 
NRMP suit alleged that program rules restrict movement from one program to another. 
Complaint, supra note 1, ¶ 88(b). Restrictions need not be artificial in nature, however, to 
result in unraveling. The costs associated with changing positions, such as moving costs 
or the costs of gaining familiarity with a new environment, may be enough to impede later 
movement. The higher these transactions costs, the more likely unraveling is to occur. 
 169. In general, from an efficiency standpoint it is important that mismatches, 
whether due to misinformation, changing preferences, or other factors, be corrected. Rules 
that impede movement from one residency to another, either outright or by raising the 
costs of movement, may therefore contribute to inefficiency. The plaintiffs in the NRMP 
suit alleged that “the ACGME imposes substantial obstacles to the ability of a resident 
physician to transfer employment from one employer to another during the period of 
residency.” Complaint, supra note 1, ¶ 88(b). 
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must be a difference in the relative valuations programs assign 
the candidates, or in the relative valuations candidates assign 
the programs. In the above example, it is because program B’s 
degree of preference of Y to Z is stronger than program A’s degree 
of preference of Y to Z that it is more efficient for Y to join 
program B. 
In the presence of initial preferences such as those in the 
above example, reallocation of surplus among the participating 
parties is necessary to achieve the efficient result. The example 
was posed in terms of an initial allocation of surplus, and then 
reallocation in the form of a bonus. In the real world, however, 
students do not think in terms of surpluses and bonuses, but in 
terms of program attributes and compensation. Students’ 
preferences for a program are a function of the quality of the 
training and educational opportunities the program provides, as 
well as the program’s geographical location, culture, and 
prestige.170 Their preferences will also be a function of the 
program’s immediate monetary benefits, including its stipend.171 
Programs’ preferences for students will be based on the benefits 
the programs anticipate the students will generate, whether 
these benefits take the form of providing valuable patient care 
services, assisting in research, or enhancing the teaching 
physicians’ work environment. The ability of programs to recruit 
successfully the students they most prefer depends on the degree 
to which they can influence these students’ choices. One way to 
influence these choices is to increase the students’ calculations of 
expected “surplus” by increasing stipends. So, for example, the $3 
bonus that B offered might in reality take the form of a higher 
stipend. This higher compensation will increase the prospective 
residents’ anticipated surplus, which in turn will increase their 
ranking of the program, which in turn will affect the match that 
is assigned, thereby affecting the total surplus generated by the 
                                                          
 170. Cf. David A. Thomas, The Law School Rankings Are Harmful Deceptions: A 
Response to Those Who Praise the Rankings and Suggestions for a Better Approach to 
Evaluating Law Schools, 40 HOUS. L. REV. 419, 432–33 (2003) (listing location, prestige, 
rankings, financial incentives, and quality of education as some of the reasons prospective 
law students prefer certain schools over others). 
 171. The relative influence of training and monetary compensation on prospective 
residents’ choices is an empirical question. Quality of training has certainly long been an 
important criterion. Positions in teaching hospitals (hospitals with a medical-school 
affiliation) were much more sought after than those in regular community hospitals, both 
before and after World War II. LUDMERER, supra note 39, at 93, 185. Ludmerer also states 
that community “hospitals often offered financial inducements to prospective interns, but 
usually to no avail, since students would choose internships on the basis of perceived 
educational benefits, not on the size of the stipend.” Id. at 95. This statement lends 
support to the observation that residents value education and training highly, perhaps 
even more highly than hospitals value resident services. 
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final match.172 The higher stipend obviates any need for 
subsequent reallocation. 
The implication of this analysis is that the initial example 
that generated the inefficient matching might never arise in the 
first place. It does not describe a market equilibrium. Programs 
will compete for the most productive candidates by adjusting the 
compensation that they offer. As long as programs are permitted 
to set their compensation, the nature of the competitive process 
will generate surpluses for the candidates such that the ordinal 
nature of the rankings will not ultimately substantially impede 
the efficiency of the match.173 
In a model of the matching process, Bulow and Levin have 
indeed shown that if programs are able to make personalized 
offers of compensation, a stable assignment of candidates to 
programs will achieve an efficient result.174 While commentators 
have implied that there is some individual negotiation over 
residency terms,175 Bulow and Levin acknowledge that 
personalized offers are unusual.176 Instead, programs tend to offer 
a single compensation level to all potential residents. This means 
that the match outcome may not be completely efficient. Bulow 
and Levin’s results suggest that in a market in which programs 
make offers that do not individually vary, there will be some 
inefficiency, but that the nature of the competition that occurs 
limits the magnitude of inefficiency.177 Ultimately, the level of 
efficiency that an ordinal match will achieve depends on the 
structure of the participants’ underlying preferences and the 
nature of the competitive process that determines the salaries 
                                                          
 172. Sanders Chae notes that programs may refuse to increase their salaries 
“because they cannot be guaranteed that the students whom they really want (and whom 
they believe are worth a higher price) will be matched with them.” Chae, supra note 1, at 
353. It is true that program B may be nervous about increasing its salary offer by $3; if 
student Y does not rank them first, they will end up being matched to student Z at a loss 
of $3 rather than a gain of $2. But the point of the compensation increase is to solicit Y’s 
top ranking, and under the assumptions, a rational Y will rank program B first. Program 
B will be guaranteed to get the students it wants, if it has sufficient knowledge of the 
preferences of the participants in the matching process, and if it has enough money to 
offer them. See Bulow & Levin, supra note 82, for a more thorough model of matching 
mechanisms that takes into account the problems posed by making uniform offers to all 
potential residents. 
 173. See generally Bulow & Levin, supra note 82 (analyzing competitive equilibria in 
matching markets). Bulow and Levin model the types of strategies hospitals are likely to 
use in setting compensation in response to competitive pressure from other hospitals. Id. 
 174. Id. at 26–27. 
 175. See supra note 78. 
 176. Bulow & Levin, supra note 82, at 27 (“[P]articipants in the residency match 
report that personalized contingent offers are quite uncommon.”). 
 177. See id. at 3, 19–22 (explaining and demonstrating that the inefficiency is 
minimal due to the local nature of the competition among “similar opponents”). 
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offered.178 In the context that Priest considers, the federal judicial 
clerk matching process, salaries are set by the federal 
government and do not necessarily reflect the workings of a 
competitive process.179 This makes it much more difficult to 
obtain the differentiation necessary to generate an efficient 
match, regardless of whether there is a formal ordinal matching 
process. To the extent compensation in residency programs is 
permitted to vary, it is more likely that the residency match will 
generate efficient results. 
4. Summary: Factors in an Efficiency Assessment of the 
Match. Ultimately, an efficiency analysis of the residency match 
must include a comparison of the aggregate benefits for all 
participants in a market characterized by early-offer competition 
(unraveling) to a market characterized by a formal matching 
mechanism. For an individual participant, the most important 
determinant of benefit is likely the quality of the partnership 
produced. The quality of the partnership produced in each setting 
will depend on the nature of competition in each setting. 
Priest argues that when negotiation over terms is 
constrained, the timing of offers becomes the mechanism used to 
express the preferences of market participants: “In the context of 
the clerkship market where . . . price signals are suppressed, 
time-of-offer serves as a market-clearing mechanism to allow 
judges with higher intensities of preference for clerks to bid them 
away from judges whose intensities of preference are lower.”180 
This description is reasonable in an unraveling market where the 
initial match is binding.181 The stronger the preference of a 
participant for a particular partner relative to other potential 
                                                          
 178. This conclusion is evident from Bulow and Levin’s careful theoretical evaluation 
of the efficiency properties of matches. In analyses not described here, they investigate 
the effects of a variety of assumptions. See id. for more details. 
 179. Priest, supra note 26, at 154–55. In Priest’s view, it is this rigidity of terms that 
generates the unraveling phenomenon. See id. at 155–58.  
 180. Id. at 174. 
 181. If the initial match were not binding, and if formation of a new match were 
costless, then unraveling would not occur. There would be no benefit to forming an early 
match because a partner offered a preferable match later would simply abandon the early 
one. This process would ensure an efficient result. Any barriers to movement, however, 
would impede this efficient result. This is one justification for the Department of Justice’s 
challenge to residency program “guidelines” that limited the ability of programs to recruit 
residents away from other programs. See Complaint ¶ 16, United States v. Ass’n of 
Family Practice Residency Dirs., No. 96-575-CV-W-2 (W.D. Mo. Aug. 15, 1996), available 
at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/cases/f0700/0774.pdf (“The Guidelines embody an agreement 
among the member family practice residency program directors to limit . . . competition 
among themselves.”); see also supra notes 168–69 (explaining how constraints on 
negotiation and movement contribute to unraveling and inefficient results). 
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candidates, the more quickly that participant will want to form a 
match to avoid the risk of losing that partner. In this way, an 
early offer can be a signal of preferences. If the early offer is an 
accurate signal, and if participants respond by forming matches 
based on these signals (perhaps because they benefit from 
matching to partners who prefer them), early offers will generate 
productive gains and an efficient result. 
Unfortunately, early offers are quite noisy signals of 
preferences for match partners. First, they are the product of 
participant preferences at the time the match is formed, and not 
their preferences at the time of the residency itself. As discussed 
in subpart III.B, participants’ partner preferences may change 
over time, both as their own needs change and as their 
information base grows. Because the benefits of the match can 
accrue only after the residency begins, it should be participants’ 
preferences at this later time that matter for the calculation of 
aggregate social welfare. 
In addition, early offers reflect not only the participants’ 
desire for a particular match, but also the level of uncertainty 
that the participants face about the likelihood of other offers 
materializing and the participants’ level of risk aversion.182 When 
uncertainty exists, early offers may be preferable to late offers. 
Individuals who are uncertain about their own qualifications, for 
example, cannot possibly accurately forecast how well they might 
fare if the matching process is delayed until more information is 
revealed. Rather than face a broad distribution of potential 
payoffs, they may prefer to establish a match early. In other 
words, the match provides insurance value. This insurance value 
complicates efforts to infer preferences about match outcomes 
from offer timing. The decision to make or accept an early offer is 
as much a signal of risk aversion as it is a signal of preference for 
the other party. In general, early offers and acceptances may 
provide some indication of market participants’ partner 
preferences, but because they are the product of limited 
information and risk aversion, they are not likely to produce 
                                                          
 182. See, e.g., Hao Li & Wing Suen, Risk Sharing, Sorting, and Early Contracting, 
108 J. POL. ECON. 1058, 1061 (2000) (“[E]arly contracting is positively related to the 
degree of risk aversion of workers and to the degree of uncertainty regarding ability.”). 
The importance of uncertainty and insurance value for equilibria in matching markets 
has been explored mathematically in several papers on early contracting. See id. 
(modeling competitive early contracting as a function of risk aversion); Hao Li & Wing 
Suen, Self-Fulfilling Early-Contracting Rush, 45 INT’L ECON. REV. 301, 302 (2004) 
(recognizing that “[i]ncentives to sign early contracts in a competitive market can be 
understood in terms of the trade-off between the insurance benefits and the sorting 
inefficiencies generated by early contracts”); Suen, supra note 117, at 103–05 
(demonstrating that unraveling is related to risk aversion). 
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matches of as high quality as those produced by matching 
mechanisms. 
Note, however, that the insurance value associated with 
forming a partnership based on an early offer provides a real 
benefit to a risk-averse prospective resident or clerk.183 While 
some risks could be completely avoided through the use of a 
matching mechanism—for example, the risk that a candidate will 
be displaced by a less-qualified candidate because of information 
failures—others, such as the risk that the candidate will prove to 
be less qualified than he or she hopes, cannot. In an assessment 
of total welfare, the insurance value of an early-offer system 
should be taken into account along with the quality of the 
resulting match. So too should the fact that early knowledge of a 
match may facilitate planning; an applicant may want to know 
the location of a future residency so that his or her spouse can 
begin searching for employment in the same location, for 
example. Because early-offer competition gives those who 
experience high disutility from uncertainty the flexibility to 
accept early offers, it may generate a higher level of benefit than 
a coordinated match for at least some participants. 
Just as uncoordinated and coordinated markets may produce 
different levels of benefit, they may also entail different levels of 
cost. The differences are likely to be insubstantial, however. 
Costs associated with any matching process, coordinated or 
uncoordinated, include the costs of collecting data about potential 
match partners and of processing this data to determine one’s 
rankings of potential partners. Establishing a relationship early 
in the process allows participants to discontinue their search, 
saving costs such as those associated with subsequent 
interviews.184 But because it is important to establish a match 
early, participants in the early-offer competition process must 
prepare by evaluating potential partners in the same way that 
participants of a coordinated match process would. Participants 
must identify their preferred partners before the process begins, 
so that they can arrange interviews sufficiently early to preserve 
the possibility of an offer.185 Savings from having less information 
                                                          
 183. See, e.g., Suen, supra note 117, at 117 (stating that “assignment markets tend to 
produce a distribution of income that is more dispersed than the distribution of ability” 
and that this dispersion creates a demand for insurance among market participants that 
can be met through early contracting). 
 184. Chae observes that the match may reduce transaction costs by streamlining the 
interview and bargaining process (as does Crall, supra note 1, at 270), but also argues 
that it may escalate costs by increasing the number of interviews conducted by 
participants fearful of failing to match. Chae, supra note 1, at 354. 
 185. Priest notes that in an unraveling market, participants are likely to invest in 
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to evaluate at an early time would likely be offset by the 
additional processing costs involved in trying to predict match 
quality based on this information.186 
Evaluating the relative welfare effects of early-offer 
competition and a coordinated match requires weighing the 
aggregate benefits and costs produced by each. If the costs of the 
two competitive systems are indeed similar, the welfare 
comparison turns on the question of whether the benefits 
associated with the superior outcome of a coordinated match 
exceed the benefits associated with flexible timing. The current 
timing of the NRMP, in the spring of students’ fourth year, may 
already reflect an implicit weighing of the gains from superior 
matches resulting from the later timing of the match against the 
gains from earlier resolution of uncertainty. If held later, the 
match would give residents little advance notice of their future 
assignments. If held earlier, preparations for the match would 
need to begin in students’ third year, when they have just begun 
their clinical rotations, depriving them of experience that may be 
important for determining their desired career path. It is likely 
that the timing of the match is satisfactory for the majority of 
participants. Early-offer competition would allow those with a 
preference for earlier matches to satisfy their preference, but 
only at the cost of producing mismatches among those who, for 
strategic reasons, must make or accept offers before they 
otherwise would. There is no reason to expect that early-offer 
competition would produce higher aggregate welfare for market 
participants than would the match. 
This welfare comparison of early-offer competition and the 
residency match for the most part omits discussion of one of 
match critics’ core complaints: the potential effect of the 
residency match on compensation.187 In the medical residency 
market, unlike the clerkship market, individual residency 
programs are at least arguably empowered to compete with one 
another by setting their own compensation levels.188 If the 
                                                          
pre-market research and sorting in order to obtain successful matches. Priest, supra note 
26, at 163. 
 186. On the other hand, early offer competition might conserve costs because it 
permits credible offers, which can serve as a low-cost source of information for other 
parties. See supra note 66 and accompanying text (explaining that potential employers 
who observe credible offers made by other employers can free ride off of these employers’ 
investment in assessing the quality of a candidate). 
 187. See, e.g., Complaint, supra note 1, ¶ 83 (alleging that the “matching program 
has the purpose and effect of depressing, standardizing and stabilizing compensation”). 
 188. Salaries for federal clerks are determined in accordance with a federal formula 
based on experience, bar membership, and locality. See Federal Law Clerk Information 
System, Law Clerk Employment Information, https://lawclerks.ao.uscourts.gov/ 
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residency match mechanism affects not only the identities of 
partners matched to each other, but also wage levels, then the 
welfare analysis presented thus far is incomplete. It takes the 
identities of the market participants as given, and uses the 
benefits and costs accruing to these participants as the measure 
of welfare. But distorted wages can affect the quantity and 
identity of market participants, necessitating a broader welfare 
analysis. 
D. The Role of Compensation in an Efficiency Analysis 
The plaintiffs argue that the NRMP’s actions in operating 
the match have depressed compensation.189 To the extent that the 
plaintiffs’ argument is correct, it raises two concerns. The first 
concern is distributional: Any mechanism that depresses 
compensation favors residency programs and disfavors residents. 
Not-for-profit teaching hospitals that operate residency programs 
cannot redistribute gains to owners or other affiliated 
individuals, so any savings resulting from lower compensation 
must be put to other uses.190 They could be passed through to 
payers such as the federal government, which would then not 
need to pay as much to support resident training.191 Alternatively, 
they could be reallocated toward other aspects of the hospital’s 
mission, such as conducting medical research or providing care 
                                                          
employinfo.htm (last visited Oct. 1, 2005) (describing criteria determining law clerk 
salaries). 
 189. Complaint, supra note 1, ¶ 92. 
 190. See THE MIT DICTIONARY OF MODERN ECONOMICS, supra note 134, at 308 
(defining nonprofit institutions as firms that “either explicitly or implicitly do not exist to 
make a profit”). Hospitals that wish to maintain tax exemption under § 501(c)(3) of the 
Internal Revenue Code must ensure that no part of their net earnings “inures to the 
benefit of any private shareholder or individual.” 26 U.S.C. § 501 (c)(3) (2000).  
 191. Mark Pauly has similarly pointed out that if an insurer acts as an agent for 
consumers, consumers can gain from the insurer’s exercise of monopsony power in its 
purchase of medical services. Mark V. Pauly, Managed Care, Market Power, and 
Monopsony, 33 HEALTH SERVS. RES. 1439, 1449 (1998). In contrast, a for-profit institution 
exercising monopsony power is unlikely to pass on its price cut to customers. See id. at 
1449–50 (noting that “all of the lower price paid to providers by monopsonistic insurers 
might not get translated into lower final product prices for insureds”). Blair and Harrison 
explain that if the monopsonist sells into a competitive market, it will charge the 
competitive price; if it sells into a market in which it has monopoly power, it will charge a 
higher price. ROGER D. BLAIR & JEFFREY L. HARRISON, MONOPSONY: ANTITRUST LAW AND 
ECONOMICS 39–42 (1993); see also Marius Schwartz, Econ. Dir. of Enforcement, U.S. Dep’t 
of Justice, Address at the Fifth Annual Health Care Antitrust Forum at the Northwestern 
University School of Law: Buyer Power Concerns and the Aetna-Prudential Merger, Part 
II.B (Oct. 20, 1999), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/speeches/3924.pdf 
(suggesting that monopsony power that lowers supplier prices may not ultimately benefit 
consumers). 
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for the indigent.192 Some might consider such a redistribution 
appropriate in light of physicians’ future incomes or their status 
as medical professionals, particularly when residency programs’ 
savings are redirected toward the production of public goods. 
Others, however, would undoubtedly argue that it is unfair to 
place the financial burden of supporting such functions on 
residents already struggling with the burden of considerable 
debt.193 While this fairness concern is not ordinarily part of an 
antitrust analysis, Congress might choose to take it into account 
when evaluating the merits of an antitrust exemption. 
The second concern, however, is one arguably at the core of 
antitrust law: the association between depressed compensation 
and inefficiency. It is natural to think that lower resident wages 
must translate to lower prices of care for patients, thus 
increasing their consumption of care and, all else equal, 
improving their welfare,194 but this is not necessarily the case. To 
understand the relationship between low wages and efficiency in 
a conventional market, first consider the relationship between 
high prices and efficiency. Economic theory suggests that a seller 
of a good who operates in a perfectly competitive market will 
price the good at its marginal cost of production.195 If the seller 
prices the good above cost, competitors will offer the same good at 
a lower price and the seller will lose its customers. When goods 
are priced at marginal cost, all consumers who value the good at 
a level higher than the cost of production will purchase it. This is 
an economically efficient outcome. A failure to consume a good 
valued higher than its cost of production would impose a loss on 
                                                          
 192. Skeptical observers might speculate that teaching hospitals would instead 
allocate gains from savings toward administrators, other employees, or teaching 
physicians, or squander the gains through inefficiency. An examination of this issue is 
beyond the scope of this Article. 
 193. In 2003, the median amount of medical school debt for the 85% of public medical 
school students who graduated with debt was $100,000. Paul Jolly, Medical School 
Tuition and Young Physicians’ Indebtedness, 24 HEALTH AFF. 527, 528 (2005). 
 194. Chae suggests, for example, that “[i]t is also hard to believe that the Match 
reduces output by decreasing the amount of health care that teaching hospitals provide. 
Indeed, low salaries might increase output by enabling teaching hospitals to hire more 
residents, leading to more health care.” Chae, supra note 1, at 354. Interestingly, such a 
scenario would imply that residents’ stipends have not been depressed below competitive 
levels. Specifically, if wages are depressed, hospitals should not be able to find additional 
residents willing to work at the offered wages. If a hospital is able to attract additional 
residents of comparable quality to its current residents after lowering its salary, then its 
previous salary exceeded competitive levels. 
 195. See STEVEN E. LANDSBURG, PRICE THEORY AND APPLICATIONS 188–89 (5th ed. 
2002) (explaining that a firm operating in a competitive environment will produce goods 
until the price of those goods equals the marginal cost of production).  
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society. Marginal cost pricing achieves an efficient result because 
it ensures that this sacrifice does not occur.196 
By definition, companies with monopoly power can 
successfully raise prices above marginal cost.197 The lone producer 
who erects barriers to entry, or multiple producers who collude, 
can successfully increase prices because there are no competitors 
threatening to lure customers away with lower prices. When 
producers with monopoly power raise prices, they will sell less 
output relative to the perfectly competitive equilibrium.198 They 
will end up selling their products only to the customers who 
value the product the most.199 Customers who value the good 
above its marginal cost, but below the monopoly price, will refuse 
to purchase the good.200 Potential benefit to society will be 
sacrificed as a result. Customers whose valuation falls between 
marginal cost and the monopoly price will spend their money on 
goods they value less, resulting in allocative inefficiency. The 
harm to consumers from supracompetitive prices exceeds the 
additional profits gained by producers.201 While some of the 
surplus associated with consumption of the product is 
transferred from consumer to producer through the higher price, 
the remainder simply disappears because less of the product is 
consumed. Monopolies are associated with supracompetitive 
prices, which result in suboptimal quantities consumed and 
therefore inefficiency.202 
Reducing wages below competitive levels may similarly 
result in allocative inefficiency.203 A seller who can raise output 
                                                          
 196. More specifically, it is efficient because it ensures that neither sacrifice nor 
waste occurs. If price were for some reason lower than cost, then consumers who value the 
product less than its production cost may nonetheless consume it. The result is economic 
waste. 
 197. See SAMUELSON & NORDHAUS, supra note 62, at 161 (“When a firm has market 
power in a particular market . . . the firm can raise the price of its product above its 
marginal cost.”). 
 198. Or alternatively, producers with monopoly power are able to sustain high prices 
by restricting the quantity of output sold. See LANDSBURG, supra note 195, at 344–45 
(noting that monopolies restrict output to sustain higher prices and generate higher 
profits). 
 199. See id. at 345 exhibit 10.2 (illustrating graphically that only those consumers 
who value a product the most will purchase goods at monopoly price). 
 200. Id.  
 201. See id. at 344–45 (demonstrating that there is a net social welfare loss 
associated with monopoly pricing because the consumers’ losses exceed the producer’s 
gain). 
 202. See id. 
 203. See, e.g., BLAIR & HARRISON, supra note 191, at 36–39 (explaining how 
monopsony results in social welfare loss); Pauly, supra note 191, at 1445–51 (exploring 
the circumstances under which monopsony can result in inefficiency); Schwartz, supra 
note 191, Part II.A (describing the effects of monopsony). 
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prices above the competitive level is said to have monopoly 
power; a buyer who can depress input prices (such as wages) 
below the competitive level is said to have monopsony power.204 
While in the monopoly case a higher price is associated with a 
lower quantity sold, in the monopsony case a lower price is 
associated with a lower quantity bought.205 More specifically, 
when a monopolist raises the price it charges for its output, some 
of the customers who would have purchased output at the 
competitive price will refuse to purchase output at the higher 
price.206 When a monopsonist lowers the compensation it offers to 
suppliers (such as workers), some of the suppliers who would 
otherwise have been willing to supply a good or service (such as 
labor) will refuse to do so.207 In the monopoly case, there is a 
relationship between the higher output price charged and the 
lower quantity sold; in the monopsony case, there is a 
relationship between the lower input price offered and the lower 
quantity of input bought.208 Monopolies result in allocative 
inefficiency when consumers buy less valuable products; 
monopsonies result in allocative inefficiency when workers divert 
their time to leisure or accept employment in positions in which 
they generate less value. Monopolies sacrifice gains from trade 
between producers and consumers; monopsonies sacrifice gains 
from trade between producers and suppliers (such as workers).209 
Lower input prices achieved through the exercise of buyers’ 
market power may thus decrease social welfare. 
One question to be asked in light of the resident antitrust 
suit’s compensation claims is whether teaching hospitals exercise 
monopsony power through the use of the match, thus decreasing 
social welfare. If the reasoning of match critics were based on 
this standard monopsony framework, it would go something like 
this: hospitals collude through the match system in order to keep 
the wages they pay low. These low wages cause inefficiency 
because too few residents will work; residents who were willing 
                                                          
 204. See THE MIT DICTIONARY OF MODERN ECONOMICS, supra note 134, at 290–91 
(defining monopoly power); see also Schwartz, supra note 191, Part II.A (defining 
monopsony power). 
 205. See Schwartz, supra note 191, Part II.A (explaining that the “monopolist raises 
prices above the competitive level by restricting the quantity it sells” and that the 
“monopsonist depresses the input price it pays below the competitive level by reducing the 
input quantity it purchases”). 
 206. See id. (explaining that “at higher prices less is demanded”). 
 207. Alternatively, the monopsonist is able to sustain low input prices by restricting 
the quantity of input purchased. Schwartz, supra note 191, Part II.A. 
 208. Id. 
 209. See BLAIR & HARRISON, supra note 191, at 39 (noting that there are “unrealized 
gains from further trade” between firms and workers in monopsonies). 
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to work for the competitive wage now direct their efforts 
elsewhere. If the match is associated with lower wages and the 
hiring of fewer residents, the match likely decreases social 
welfare by lowering total output.210 
Match proponents would likely object to this 
characterization of the match. Because the match dictates only 
the mechanism for assigning residents to programs, and not 
wage or employment levels, its rules do not directly facilitate the 
creation of a collusive monopsony.211 The match itself does not 
provide an enforcement mechanism that limits the number of 
residents that teaching hospitals can seek, either individually or 
collectively.212 An individual program might decide unilaterally to 
                                                          
 210. The consumer welfare effects of a change of resident output depend critically on 
the nature of the market for the services provided by residents. For example, if competing 
nonteaching hospitals offer the very same services through nurse practitioners, nurses, 
technicians, or nonresident physicians, and if they operate on a flat long-run marginal 
cost curve, they can simply expand the services they provide by the same amount that the 
teaching hospitals have decreased the services provided by residents. If total output is 
unaffected, consumers remain unharmed by teaching hospitals’ actions. Since the “main 
concern of the antitrust laws” is the consumer, the possibility that consumers might be 
unaffected by the exercise of monopsony power raises the question of whether such 
exercise should be viewed as an antitrust violation at all. HERBERT HOVENKAMP, 12 
ANTITRUST LAW ¶ 2011b1 (1999). If there is no output reduction, is there any antitrust 
concern? Hovenkamp considers an example of bid rigging in the context of an auction. Id. 
¶ 2011c. When all goods are sold, there is no reduction in output, just “mere wealth 
transfer” from the seller to the buyer “that the antitrust laws were not designed to 
remedy.” Id. Nonetheless, Hovenkamp suggests that the bid rigging should be a per se 
violation of antitrust laws in part because of the long-run reduction in sellers’ incentive to 
sell. Id. The Supreme Court has held that price-fixing by purchasers violates the Sherman 
Act “even though . . . the persons specially injured under the treble damage claim are 
sellers, not customers or consumers.” Mandeville Island Farms, Inc. v. Am. Crystal Sugar 
Co., 334 U.S. 219, 235 (1948). Seizing on this language, the Tenth Circuit rejected a 
defendant’s argument that a monopsony should not be actionable unless it injures 
consumers. Telecor Commc’ns, Inc. v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 305 F.3d 1124, 1133–36 
(10th Cir. 2002) (holding that suppliers can claim the protection of antitrust laws without 
a showing of harm to consumers and dismissing language in two district court opinions 
that implied otherwise). 
 211. See supra Part II (discussing the general rules and nature of the matching 
process). 
 212. Other sorts of enforcement mechanisms may exist, however. In the years before 
the match, medical educators limited the number of specialists by limiting the number of 
residency positions available. LUDMERER, supra note 39, at 99. Today, the ACGME’s 
Residency Review Committees may limit the number of residency positions available. 
ACGME, Common Program Requirements § IV.B, available at http://www.acgme.org/ 
acWebsite/dutyHours/dh_dutyHoursCommonPR.pdf (last visited Oct. 1, 2005) (“The RRC 
will approve the number of residents based upon established written criteria that include 
the adequacy of resources for resident education (e.g., the quality and volume of patients 
and related clinical material available for education), faculty-resident ratio, institutional 
funding, and the quality of faculty teaching.”). Teaching hospitals deemed to have too 
many residents have lost their accreditation. See, e.g., Charles Ornstein, King/Drew 
Medical Center States Its Case in Plea to Accrediting Council, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 25, 2003, 
at B3 (reporting that a residency program lost its accreditation due to training more fifth-
(4) MADISONG1 10/10/2005 2:52 PM 
2005] THE RESIDENCY MATCH 809 
limit the number of residents it hires, but other programs may 
then respond by hiring more residents. Similarly, the match 
rules are completely silent on the issue of compensation, and a 
unilateral effort to decrease the compensation offered is likely to 
be unsuccessful. 
Express restrictions on wages, however, are not the only 
means of limiting compensation. The match-imposed limitations 
on bargaining for higher salaries of the sort discussed in subpart 
III.A, for example, may depress compensation without any 
express agreement. The technical theoretical models of Kamecke 
and Levin and Bulow described in subpart III.A also demonstrate 
that under certain assumptions, the very structure of the match 
can depress compensation;213 neither model depends on 
coordinated limits on compensation or hiring to achieve its 
results.214 If compensation drops below competitive levels, 
prospective residents may seek other positions, resulting in 
inefficiency and the loss of social welfare.215 
                                                          
year residents than permitted). The antitrust suit challenged such limits. Complaint, 
supra note 1, ¶ 88(a). But there is a procompetitive justification for such limits. In an 
environment where it is difficult to assess the quality of care, patients may prefer to rely 
on organizations such as the ACGME to ensure that physicians have received adequate 
training. By enforcing resource-based limits on the number of residents, the ACGME may 
be able to assure training quality more easily, thus promoting the sale of resident 
services. See infra note 295 and accompanying text for a discussion of the effects of 
limiting residency positions. 
 213. See supra notes 80, 82 and accompanying text. 
 214. See supra notes 80, 82 and accompanying text (describing the models). 
 215. This statement assumes that the more resident services provided, the higher 
consumer welfare. If physicians lacking patients can induce their own demand by taking 
advantage of patients’ lack of information about the appropriateness of treatment, 
however, then social welfare might be improved by having fewer physicians. See Richard 
A. Cooper & Linda H. Aiken, Human Inputs: The Health Care Workforce and Medical 
Markets, 26 J. HEALTH POL. POL’Y & L. 925, 933–34 (2001) (considering the proposition 
that “supplier-induced demand implies the provision of excessive or inappropriate care” 
but concluding that “physician-induced demand is of small magnitude”). Peter Hammer 
has suggested that “antitrust law should recognize a defense for private acts that restrain 
‘competition’ under the traditional antitrust analysis but advance total welfare.” Peter J. 
Hammer, Antitrust Beyond Competition: Market Failures, Total Welfare, and the 
Challenge of Intramarket Second-Best Tradeoffs, 98 MICH. L. REV. 849, 851 (2000). Those 
who believe that the match reduces the quantity of physician services but also believe 
that there are “too many” physicians could characterize the match as a private act that 
advances total welfare. It is not clear, however, that match-induced downward wage 
pressure would satisfy all of Hammer’s criteria for the exception. See id. (advancing four 
requirements for a welfare defense). In addition, the debate over whether we have too 
many or too few physicians largely revolves around efforts to predict consumer demand; 
predictions of “too many” physicians have recently been displaced by predictions of “too 
few” physicians. See Cooper & Aiken, supra, at 933 (stating that “shortages are 
developing in some of the specialties”). See generally David Blumenthal, New Steam from 
an Old Cauldron—The Physician-Supply Debate, 350 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1780 (2004) 
(“Just yesterday, it seems, the conventional wisdom was a confident prediction that we 
faced a worrisome surplus of physicians. But today, a swelling chorus of experts contends 
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The extent to which inefficiency might arise in the residency 
market depends on a variety of institutional features. It is 
possible that even with lower levels of compensation, the total 
number of residents working would remain the same. There is 
little evidence that substantial numbers of American-trained 
medical graduates go unhired due to residency program 
limitations; each year the vast majority of U.S. seniors are 
successfully matched through the NRMP.216 The problematic 
monopsony effects outlined previously assume that total resident 
supply is responsive to the compensation offered, but it is 
possible that resident supply is fixed over the relevant wage 
range. If the resident supply is unresponsive, the programs 
would still be able to attract a full complement of residents, 
despite the lower wages, and there would be no immediate 
efficiency loss. 
Even if in the short term all medical graduates are hired, 
there may be a concern about the long-term effects of lower 
resident compensation.217 Lower resident compensation may 
translate into lower lifetime income for physicians, decreasing 
the incentive to enter medical school.218 A substantial decrease in 
wages would be required, however, for lower medical school 
application rates to translate into lower numbers of U.S.-
educated residents. Over the last twenty years, the number of 
applicants to U.S. medical schools has fluctuated, from 35,720 in 
                                                          
that we may face an equally worrisome shortage of physicians.”). 
 216. See supra note 54 and accompanying text (discussing placement in residency 
programs). While most seniors in American medical schools find residency positions, 
many international medical graduates do not. NAT’L RESIDENT MATCHING PROGRAM, 
RESULTS AND DATA: 2003 MATCH 5 (2003). The total number of residency position 
applicants, including international medical graduates, exceeds the number of positions 
listed in the match. Id. at 6–7. For example, the ratio of positions per U.S. senior was 
approximately 1.5 in 2003, while the ratio of positions per applicant, including 
international medical graduates, was 0.87. Id. at 7. The addition of international medical 
graduates to the resident market will tend to shift the resident supply curve outward, 
decreasing compensation for existing residents, but improving social welfare. See THOMAS 
A. PUGEL, INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS 361–63 (12th ed. 2004) (showing graphically that 
addition of migrants to a labor market decreases equilibrium wages but produces gains 
for the market’s employers that exceed the losses to the market’s existing employees). 
 217. See BLAIR & HARRISON, supra note 191, at 72 (explaining that although a 
collusive monopsony in a market with a fixed supply of wheat has only distributive 
consequences in the short run, “[a]s producer profits are reduced by the collusion, their 
incentives to plant durum wheat are reduced and they may reduce supply in the future 
[which has] adverse consequences for consumer welfare in the future”). 
 218. Lower resident compensation translates into lower lifetime income for 
physicians, assuming that there is no corresponding increase in income during post-
residency years. For an analysis suggesting that actions that decrease the number of 
residents may increase long-term physician income, see infra note 295. 
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1982-83 to 46,965 in 1996-97, and back to 33,625 in 2002-03.219 
But the number of accepted applicants has not varied nearly as 
much. The number of applicants accepted was 17,294 in 1982-83, 
17,385 in 1996-97, and 17,592 in 2002-03.220 The ratios of 
applicants to accepted applicants were therefore 2.1:1.0, 2.7:1.0, 
and 1.9:1.0, respectively.221 Far more people desire to become 
physicians than actually become physicians. Lower stipends 
might discourage some students from entering the profession, 
but the high ratio of applications to acceptances indicates that 
others would be willing to take their places. Lower stipends are 
unlikely to have a significant dynamic effect on the quantity of 
U.S. residents.222 
They can, however, have a dynamic effect on the quality of 
U.S. residents. Talented and productive college graduates facing 
lucrative alternative career paths may choose to pursue those 
opportunities rather than enrolling in medical school because the 
bargaining power of the residency programs depresses wages just 
enough to make a difference. These potential applicants’ medical 
school positions, and later, residency positions, may be taken 
over by lower-quality applicants.223 If medical schools apply an 
absolute quality screen to applicants so that they refuse to admit 
applicants of lower quality, lower wages may be associated with 
fewer U.S. residents; if medical schools apply a relative quality 
screen to applicants so that they have a set number of positions 
available and will fill them with lower-quality applicants if 
necessary, lower wages will be associated with lower-quality 
residents.224 The degree to which the quality of residents would 
decline depends on the extent to which the students who fill the 
                                                          
 219. Barbara Barzansky & Sylvia I. Etzel, Educational Programs in US Medical 
Schools, 2002-2003, 290 JAMA 1190, 1192 tbl.3 (2003). 
 220. Id. 
 221. Id. 
 222. This may change if the number of medical school positions increases. In 2005, 
the AAMC recommended a 15% increase in medical school enrollment by 2015. Press 
Release, AAMC, AAMC Calls for Modest Increase in Medical School Enrollment (Feb. 22, 
2005), available at http://www.aamc.org/newsroom/pressrel/2005/050222.htm. 
 223. Cf. Pauly, supra note 191, at 1451 (noting that in health insurance, monopsony 
may be associated with “lower quality, rather than . . . fewer people insured”).  
 224. In 1989, when the ratio of first-time applicants to medical school places fell to 
1.2:1.0, some medical schools declined to fill their classes. Cooper & Aiken, supra note 
215, at 931. It appears, then, that in 1989 medical schools perceived the quality of 
rejected applicants to be lower than that of their accepted counterparts. See id. (reasoning 
that “as a means of maintaining quality” the schools did not fill their classes). On the 
other hand, the AAMC has recently advocated an expansion of medical school enrollment, 
and the AAMC’s president argues that this expansion would not decrease quality. See 
Myrle Croasdale, Physician Shortage?: Push Is on for More Med Students, AM. MED. 
NEWS, Mar. 14, 2005, at 1. 
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vacated medical school slots can, with training, become residents 
of comparable quality to the students they replace. 
The sensitivity of prospective residents—or prospective 
medical school applicants—to resident compensation levels is 
ultimately an empirical question. While reductions in potential 
lifetime income will affect the quantity or quality of resident 
supply on the margin, institutional features of the graduate 
medical education process are likely to limit the magnitude of the 
effects. The role of the residency position as the sole gateway to a 
future career in medicine will tend to limit the responsiveness of 
the resident supply to resident compensation. State licensure 
laws generally require that physicians receive training in a 
residency program as a precondition to practicing 
independently.225 Students who decide not to pursue a residency 
therefore also forgo any income that would be derived from 
professional practice. Because for many students the average 
income of medical practice is likely to exceed that of any other 
career path, they have a financial incentive to join a residency 
program, even if the compensation during residency years is 
low.226 Because the residency market is linked to the market for 
physician services, and state legislatures impose a barrier to 
entry in the market for physician services, students may join 
residency programs even if the initial compensation is not as 
high as it could otherwise be. The higher compensation earned by 
physicians insulated by state licensure laws against competition 
tends to offset the negative incentive effects that would otherwise 
result from lower resident compensation.227 
While the discussion so far has focused on the relationship 
between potential residents’ demand for residency positions and 
efficiency, Kamecke focuses on the flip side of the analysis: the 
relationship between teaching hospitals’ demand for residents 
and efficiency.228 In the Kamecke model, inefficiency arises from 
                                                          
 225. See, e.g., N.Y. State Educ. Dep’t, supra note 37 (listing the requirements for 
becoming a licensed physician in the state of New York). 
 226. One author suggests that the net present value of an investment in medical 
school education is over one million dollars. Jolly, supra note 193, at 534. 
 227. This argument assumes that potential future physicians consider lifetime 
income, rather than just the income during residency years, when deciding whether to 
join the profession. If students expect their financial needs to exceed their income during 
their residency years and also expect to have insufficient access to credit, they may choose 
another career. See id. at 531 (reporting survey results finding that the cost of medical 
school was a significant deterrent to prospective medical school applicants). Educators 
have long been concerned that low resident compensation might deter students from 
pursuing training; such concerns were articulated even before the match began. 
LUDMERER, supra note 39, at 424 n.93. 
 228. Kamecke, supra note 80, at 33. 
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the possibility that the low compensation levels assured by 
competitive restraints associated with the match will lead 
hospitals to employ inefficient numbers of residents relative to 
their substitutes (such as nonresident physicians, nurses, or 
technicians).229 In other words, the match introduces distortions 
of wages that affect programs’ decisions about whether to hire 
residents in the first place. These distortions can lead to 
inefficient levels of hiring. 
The Bulow-Levin model focuses on yet another 
compensation-related source of inefficiency: mismatches. Even if 
the residency match does not affect the total number of residents 
hired, it can reduce welfare if it assigns candidates to the 
“wrong” positions, ones in which they do not achieve their 
maximum productivity. In the Bulow-Levin model, when the 
programs offer a uniform compensation rate to all of their 
residents, they choose a compensation strategy that is rational 
but nonetheless results in some mismatches.230 In particular, the 
equilibrium compensation strategy of each participating program 
will be “mixed” in the sense that the program will randomize 
compensation offers over a particular range.231 Sometimes (i.e., 
with some probability), the chosen compensation will be 
sufficiently high for the program to beat out its competitors in 
the race to attract the most productive match, and the efficient 
match will therefore result; other times, however, the chosen 
compensation will be too low, and the program’s desired resident 
will go to a competitor—an inefficient result.232 
Similarly, a resident not able to use a firm offer to negotiate 
a higher salary because of residency match constraints on pre-
match contracting might argue that this prohibition results in 
inefficient matches. More specifically, the firm offer helps to 
convey information to the market about the value of a particular 
resident.233 Without this information, a residency program may 
underestimate the value of an individual applicant, while at the 
same time perhaps overestimating the value of others. As a 
result, the program will offer a low stipend, and the applicant 
will choose another program that may ultimately generate a 
                                                          
 229. Id. at 47–48. 
 230. Bulow & Levin, supra note 82, at 18–19 (“Because there is mixing, firms and 
workers may not be efficiently matched.”). 
 231. Id. at 6–11. 
 232. See generally id. (computing the probabilities of efficient results when offers are 
randomized). 
 233. See supra Part III.A. 
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lower value from that resident. Again, the result is an inefficient 
mismatch. 
To summarize, the reason that low compensation is 
problematic from an efficiency perspective is that it results in an 
equilibrium where potential residents do not take the positions in 
which they would be the most productive. Low compensation 
levels send the wrong signals. A prospective medical student 
might choose another profession; a teaching hospital, an 
inefficient mix of employees; a prospective resident, the wrong 
residency program. In each case, resources are wasted. 
The magnitude of this waste, however, is likely to be limited. 
As previously discussed, the nature of the market for physician 
services (for example, the role of resident training as a 
prerequisite for physician licensure) will tend to constrain the 
magnitude of compensation-related distortions in the resident 
market. In addition, while Bulow and Levin do find some 
inefficiencies in the presence of a match, the magnitude of the 
distortion is small.234 The reason the distortion is small is that 
the compensation range over which each program randomizes 
overlaps with that of its closest competitors.235 The overlapping 
compensation ranges of programs of similar quality mean that 
when a resident is assigned to the “wrong” program from the 
standpoint of efficiency (because the resident ranked more highly 
the program that happened to offer the higher compensation), 
the “wrong” program is close in quality to the “right” program. 
The localized nature of the compensation competition ensures 
that the inefficiency that arises from the mismatches will be 
small.236 A numerical calculation suggests that the more firms 
and workers involved in a matching process, the lower the level 
of inefficiency.237 With 1,000 firms and 1,000 workers 
participating, for example, the calculation shows only a 0.04% 
loss in efficiency.238 
Moreover, this decrease in efficiency is measured relative to 
the competitive ideal—the perfect match. Because of the lack of 
                                                          
 234. See Bulow & Levin, supra note 82, at 3 (finding that “the inefficiency in the 
market will be small”). 
 235. See id. at 6–10, 19 (explaining the small loss of efficiency associated with 
randomizing offers). 
 236. Id. at 3, 19 (suggesting that inefficiency is limited when “firms compete ‘locally’ 
against similar opponents”). 
 237. See id. at 22 (showing a decrease in inefficiency as the number of firms 
participating in a matching program increases). 
 238. See id. The 0.04% loss in efficiency is calculated by dividing the inefficiency 
associated with 1000 firms by the surplus realized by generating an efficient match. Id. 
tbl.2. 
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information that characterizes unraveling markets, there is no 
reason to expect that a residency market without a matching 
mechanism will achieve the perfect match.239 This observation is 
also relevant to an assessment of the concerns raised by 
Kamecke’s article. Kamecke himself acknowledges the 
importance of comparing the results of the matching mechanism 
to the appropriate counterfactual: 
One has to keep in mind that the centralized procedure 
could solve the ‘unraveling’ phenomenon described by 
Roth . . . which can lead to serious distortions inside the 
matching market. As long as one cannot control these 
problems in a decentralized system, it is not useful to 
abolish a workable centralized mechanism just because 
some distortions may remain.240 
Thus, gains from implementing a centralized matching 
mechanism may exceed losses associated with any match-related 
compensation effects. 
Subpart III.B has already demonstrated how unraveling 
markets generate subpar matches that can reduce benefits to 
programs, residents, and the public (if a poor match reduces the 
quantity of medical research, for example). Unraveling markets 
may also give rise to monopsony power issues of their own. One 
recognized source of monopsony power is ignorance of the 
supplier of the purchased goods or services about other potential 
buyers.241 If early offers or exploding offers do not give 
participants sufficient time to solicit alternative offers, teaching 
programs will have considerable market power with respect to 
individual applicants.242 While it would be ideal for residents to 
search for positions and to use an offer by one firm to increase 
the stipend offered by another, a resident with an exploding offer 
may not have the opportunity to do so.243 An empirical study of 
the gastroenterologist fellowship market further suggests that 
the scope of labor markets is smaller in decentralized matching 
                                                          
 239. See, e.g., Roth & Xing, supra note 91, at 1034–35 (“Unraveling may be ex ante 
as well as ex post inefficient . . . .”). 
 240. Kamecke, supra note 80, at 48. 
 241. See ALAN MANNING, MONOPSONY IN MOTION: IMPERFECT COMPETITION IN LABOR 
MARKETS 360 (2003) (describing “ignorance among workers about labor market 
opportunities” as a source of friction that gives employers monopsony power). 
 242. See supra text accompanying notes 97–101 (discussing exploding offers to 
residents and law clerks). 
 243. See supra text accompanying note 100 (reasoning that a candidate with an 
exploding offer may not want to allow it to explode, given the candidate’s uncertainty 
about future offers). 
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markets than in centralized matching markets.244 The fewer 
employers effectively participating in the market, the more 
market power they are likely to have in setting wages. 
Abandoning the match may limit some forms of market power 
exercised by residency training programs, but it may allow for 
the introduction of others. 
The possibility that the match may under some 
circumstances depress wages relative to the competitive ideal 
thus tells us little about its social desirability. The compensation-
related effects of the match depend on multiple variables, 
including the sensitivity of residents to compensation, and any 
effects are likely to be outweighed by the benefits to residents, 
programs, and society generated through improved matching. 
IV. THE EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE ON RESIDENT COMPENSATION 
One way to investigate the net effects of the match on 
resident compensation is to examine the empirical evidence. In 
their complaint, the plaintiffs cite data that first-year residents 
earned a salary of about $35,700 during the 2000-01 employment 
year in support of their claim that anticompetitive restraints, 
including the match, have depressed compensation.245 The mean 
first-year resident compensation for an institution offering 
residency programs during the academic year 2003-04 was 
$39,809.246 To determine whether this compensation is below 
                                                          
 244. See generally Muriel Niederle & Alvin E. Roth, Unraveling Reduces Mobility in 
a Labor Market: Gastroenterology with and Without a Centralized Match, 111 J. POL. 
ECON. 1342 (2003) (comparing the entry-level market for gastroenterologists in the years 
in which it was centralized with the same market in the years prior and subsequent to 
centralization). When no centralized matching mechanism was in operation, fellows 
tended to be matched more often at the same hospitals and in the same cities where they 
worked as residents. Id. at 1343–44. This phenomenon could result from the need to rely 
on informal networks to share information about market participants. Id. at 1344. 
 245. Complaint, supra note 1, ¶ 93. 
 246. ASS’N OF AM. MED. COLLS., supra note 18, at 6. In real terms, this mean salary 
represents an increase of 0.8% over the 2002-03 year, a 2.2% increase over the 2000-01 
year, a 6.4% increase over the 1990-91 year, and an 8.2% increase over the 1980-81 year, 
but only a 1.2% increase over the 1970-71 year. Id. In their complaint, the plaintiffs cite 
stability of wages as one of the effects of the allegedly anticompetitive restraints. 
Complaint, supra note 1, ¶ 93. It is difficult to determine what the appropriate 
benchmark should be, given that supply and demand conditions can vary tremendously 
across markets. Statistics for similar markets, however, suggest that wage growth might 
indeed be low. Hospitals’ employment costs overall for civilian workers increased 9% 
between March of 1990 and 2003; the similar figure for private employers of professional 
specialty and technical occupations was 11%. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF 
LABOR, EMPLOYMENT COST INDEX, CONSTANT DOLLAR, HISTORICAL LISTING 22 tbl.3, 69 
tbl.5a (Apr. 29, 2005), available at http://www.bls.gov/web/ecconst.pdf. 
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competitive levels, it is important to first identify the appropriate 
benchmark.  
One possible comparison is to practicing nonresident 
physicians; residents make significantly less. One survey found 
that the average net income from medical practice in 1999 was 
$187,000, for example.247 But residents, particularly first-year 
residents, will not be as productive as more experienced 
physicians,248 so it is not surprising that their compensation is 
significantly lower. Compensation does increase with the number 
of years in the program: The resident-weighted mean stipend in 
2004-05 was $40,552 for a first-year resident, $44,122 for a third-
year resident, and $47,783 for a fifth-year resident.249 On the 
other hand, even the highest amount does not approach the mean 
earnings for nonresident physicians.250 This discrepancy is 
particularly glaring since the residency programs that require 
five years of training tend to be for the more highly compensated 
specialties, such as surgery; the average compensation after 
expenses for surgeons in 2002 was approximately $255,000.251 
Resident compensation might also be compared to that of 
other health care providers. The plaintiffs allege that “[r]esidents 
generally earn less, on both an annualized and hourly basis, than 
other hospital employees such as nurse practitioners and 
physician assistants.”252 In 2002, the median annual income for 
                                                          
 247. MARIE REED & PAUL B. GINSBURG, CENTER FOR STUDYING HEALTH SYSTEM 
CHANGE, DATA BULL. NO. 24, BEHIND THE TIMES: PHYSICIAN INCOME, 1995-99 (2003), 
available at http://www.hschange.org/CONTENT/544. 
 248. Cf. Robert S. Huckman & Jason R. Barro, Cohort Turnover and Productivity: 
The July Phenomenon in Teaching Hospitals 30–31 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, 
Working Paper No. 11182, 2005), available at http://papers.nber.org/papers/w11182.pdf 
(finding that the annual turnover of residents at a hospital reduces hospital productivity). 
 249. ASS’N OF AM. MED. COLLS., supra note 18, at 9. The relatively low rate of 
increase of stipends over program years and the sudden jump in physician salaries after 
residency completion suggest that stipend levels reflect factors other than resident 
productivity. One possibility is that given the transaction costs associated with moving 
between programs, residents and programs both view the residency program as a multi-
year relationship, with competition occurring at the point of entry into the program. See 
supra notes 168–69 (discussing impediments to moving between programs). If so, 
programs may choose to smooth compensation over the life of a program by paying 
residents high stipends (relative to productivity) at the beginning of the program, and 
lower stipends toward the end. Other explanations of stipend levels are considered infra, 
notes 256–76 and accompanying text.  
 250. See REED & GINSBURG, supra note 247 (reporting that the average net income 
for all patient care physicians in 1999 was $187,000).  
 251. According to the Medical Group Management Association, the median total 
compensation for family practice physicians in 2002 was $150,267; for internists, it was 
$155,530; and for surgeons, it was $255,438. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF 
LABOR, OCCUPATIONAL OUTLOOK HANDBOOK (2004-05), available at http://www.bls.gov/ 
oco/pdf/ocos074.pdf. 
 252. Complaint, supra note1, ¶ 93. 
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physician assistants employed in hospitals was $65,910; median 
income for first-year physician assistants in all settings was 
$64,670.253 The annual compensation of residents is therefore less 
than the income of not only physicians who have completed their 
training, but also other professionals who have fewer years of 
formal training and who share some of the residents’ duties.254 A 
hospital that must substitute other workers for residents is likely 
to find that its salary expenses increase. Some have estimated 
that the ACGME’s recently-imposed limits on resident work 
hours will result in increased hiring of nurse practitioners and 
others at a cost that could reach into the millions of dollars for 
large academic medical centers.255 
Comparisons of monetary compensation alone are 
misleading, however, because in addition to their stipends, 
residents receive compensation in the form of training.256 While 
the plaintiffs characterize the market being restrained as a 
market for resident services, the market in question could just as 
easily have been characterized as a market for resident 
education.257 Residency programs generally involve formal 
                                                          
 253. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, supra note 251. For more detailed descriptions of 
1997 earnings data, see American Academy of Physician Assistants, PA Incomes: Results 
from the 1997 AAPA Physician Assistant Census, available at http://www.aapa. 
org/research/97income.html (last visited Oct. 1, 2005). 
 254. While the market for resident services overlaps with the market for the services 
of physician assistants and other hospital employees, the markets are not coextensive. 
Teaching hospitals compete mainly among themselves for the services of residents, while 
they must compete with community hospitals, physician practices, and other potential 
employers for the services of other types of health care workers. The differences in 
demand for these types of labor may contribute to compensation differentials. In 
particular, some hospitals may prefer not to hire residents because of the training costs 
that would be entailed. 
 255. See Katherine Vogt, Hospitals Count Up Cost of Reduced Resident Hours, AM. 
MED. NEWS, Aug. 11, 2003, at 19, 19. 
 256. Others have noted that the exchange of educational services for patient services 
complicates the assessment of compensation and the antitrust case. See, e.g., Peter J. 
Hammer & William M. Sage, Critical Issues in Hospital Antitrust Law, 22 HEALTH AFF. 
88, 93 (2003) (noting that a “twist” to the NRMP litigation is that “two markets are 
involved simultaneously: teaching hospitals acting as buyers of residents’ clinical services, 
and residents acting as buyers of graduate medical education”); Miller & Greaney, supra 
note 1, at 915 (recognizing that “medical residents are buyers of educational services from 
seller residency programs” as well as sellers of labor to the buyer hospitals). The training 
and service aspects of residency positions and the tensions between them have long been 
recognized. See, e.g., LUDMERER, supra note 39, at 92 (describing the many duties of 
residents and stating that “[a]chieving the proper balance between education and service 
would perplex medical educators throughout the twentieth century”). 
 257. This characterization may reflect a strategic decision by the plaintiffs. Courts 
have previously recognized that monopsonistic practices in employment are subject to 
antitrust laws. See, e.g., HOVENKAMP, supra note 210, ¶ 2012c (“[A] naked agreement 
among employers limiting salaries or wages is unlawful per se.”). The Third Circuit has 
stated, however, that “[i]t may be that institutions of higher education ‘require that a 
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training sessions and direct supervision by faculty physicians.258 
When they provide their services, residents are also gaining 
experience. More advanced residents may have limited 
interaction with faculty, but still practice in a teaching hospital 
environment, which will generally expose them to a broader 
range of learning opportunities (such as more difficult or unusual 
cases) than is available to most physicians. The compensation 
that residents receive for their efforts therefore includes not just 
a stipend and other employment benefits, but also the valuable 
training that will serve as a foundation upon which to build their 
careers. The fact that training can be very valuable is evidenced 
by physicians who pursue fellowship opportunities after their 
residencies, sacrificing the income of independent practice in 
favor of stipends averaging in the $40,000 range.259 
One way to incorporate the value of training into an 
assessment of resident compensation is to reconceptualize the 
meager residency stipend as a much higher stipend that has been 
reduced implicitly by tuition. Undergraduate students typically 
do not produce significant value for their institutions through 
their labor and so must pay substantial tuition for the education 
they receive. Graduate students typically do produce value for 
their institutions, through research or teaching assistantships.260 
Because this value offsets the tuition they would otherwise pay, 
graduate students often pay only a small amount of tuition, or 
pay no tuition at all and receive a small stipend.261 Residents 
produce more value for their institutions than most graduate 
                                                          
particular practice, which could properly be viewed as a violation of the Sherman Act in 
another context, be treated differently.’” United States v. Brown Univ., 5 F.3d 658, 678 
(3d Cir. 1993) (quoting Goldfarb v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 773, 788 n.17 (1975)). For a 
discussion of the potential applicability of the court’s analysis in Brown University to the 
residency match case, see Miller & Greaney, supra note 1, at 917–18, and Chae, supra 
note 1, at 353–54. 
 258. AM. MED. ASS’N, supra note 32. 
 259. See Muriel Niederle & Alvin E. Roth, Letter to the Editor, Relationship Between 
Wages and Presence of a Match in Medical Fellowships, 290 JAMA 1153, 1153 (2003) 
(documenting fellowship compensation in various subspecialties). For further evidence of 
the value of training, see supra note 171 and accompanying text (describing the relative 
importance of training and compensation in the choice of residency positions). 
 260. See, e.g., Univ. of Houston, Graduate Catalog Online, University Policies for 
Graduate Student Assistantships, http://www.uh.edu/grad_catalog/grad_assistantship/ 
uh_policy.html (last visited Oct. 1, 2005) (listing five graduate student appointment 
categories: “teaching fellow, teaching assistant, instructional assistant, research 
assistant, and graduate assistant”). 
 261. See, e.g., Univ. of Houston, Graduate Catalog Online, Graduate Assistant 
Tuition Fellowship Policy for Students in TA/TF/IA/RA/GA Appointment Categories, 
http://www.uh.edu/grad_catalog/grad_assistantship/gatf.html (last visited Oct. 1, 2005) 
(allowing for nine resident credit hours of support per regular semester to be awarded to 
eligible graduate students). 
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students, and receive a higher stipend than graduate students.262 
But where tuition may be explicit for some graduate students, it 
is implicit for medical residents: They pay it in the form of lower 
stipends than they might otherwise receive.263 Residents, like 
other students, are willing to pay this tuition because of the long-
term benefits their training provides. In fact, one study has 
suggested that some residents would be willing to pay teaching 
hospitals for residency positions in dermatology, general surgery, 
orthopedic surgery, and radiology because physicians working in 
these areas receive high financial returns from their training.264 
Thus, while resident compensation may appear low compared to 
that of experienced physicians and other health care 
professionals, it is difficult to know whether this data 
demonstrates an anticompetitive effect because these comparison 
groups are not receiving comparable training.265 In other words, 
                                                          
 262. See ASS’N OF AM. MED. COLLS., supra note 18, at 3, 5 tbl.1 (reporting that the 
average stipend of first-year residents in 2004-05 was $40,788). 
 263. MEDICARE PAYMENT ADVISORY COMM’N, RETHINKING MEDICARE’S PAYMENT 
POLICIES FOR GRADUATE MEDICAL EDUCATION AND TEACHING HOSPITALS 7 (1999). 
 264. Sean Nicholson, Barriers to Entering Medical Specialties (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. 
Research, Working Paper No. 9649, 2003), available at http://www.nber.org/papers/ 
w9649. 
 265. Some analysts might protest that most employment has a training component to 
it, and yet significant salaries are still paid. Recent law school graduates, for example, 
often earn significantly more than recent medical school graduates, despite also receiving 
on-the-job training. See Priest, supra note 26, at 188 tbl.7 (reporting, for example, that the 
seventy-fifth percentile starting salary for medical school graduates in the South was 
$35,300, while the comparable figure for law graduates in Georgia was $100,000). Is there 
any explanation for the compensation difference, beyond anticompetitive restraints in the 
residency market? One possibility is a difference in demand facing the employer; law firm 
clients may have a higher willingness to pay for law firm associates’ services than 
government and other purchasers are prepared to pay for residents’ services. A second 
possibility is that physicians must have residency training to practice independently, 
while lawyers can practice independently without on-the-job training; physicians will 
therefore be less sensitive to low compensation levels in the short term. A third possibility 
is that law firms’ decisions about compensation, at least traditionally, have been made in 
the context of a potential long-term relationship. Recruiting and training a new lawyer 
may cost upward of $200,000. See Brenda Sandberg, Who’ll Stop the Raids?, AM. LAW., 
June 2000, at 20. For this reason it may take two to three years before a law firm 
associate begins to financially benefit a firm. Joel A. Rose, Adjusting Compensation for 
Today’s Economics, PENN. L. WKLY., Oct. 14, 2002, at F6, F6 (“Most [hiring partners] 
acknowledged that during the first two or three years with the firm, while in training to 
learn how to practice law, the great majority of associates are not worth the current 
market price.”). Law firms may be willing to provide training and high salaries because 
they anticipate that their efforts will not only attract top-notch associates to the firm, but 
also encourage them to remain; top-notch associates will eventually become profit-
generating firm partners. See Ginsburg & Wolf, supra note 152, at 953–54 (explaining 
that while “a residency director picks a future co-worker[,] . . . a hiring partner picks a 
potential future co-owner” who may affect that “partner’s personal financial and 
reputational equity over years to come”). The trajectory for residents is different. While 
hospitals could conceivably make long-term arrangements with some of their residents 
(and some residents’ programs already last longer than three years), the nature of 
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the total benefit received by medical residents may not actually 
be low relative to other providers when both monetary and 
nonmonetary forms of compensation are included in the 
calculation.266 
Ultimately, competitive compensation levels are determined 
by supply and demand, and supply and demand conditions differ 
for each of the groups that might be compared to residents, for 
reasons unrelated to the match. It is therefore unsurprising that 
compensation levels would differ. As previously explained, 
employers will likely be willing to offer higher compensation to 
experienced physicians than to residents, and residents are more 
likely to accept lower compensation than physician assistants, 
because of the on-the-job training the residents receive.267 But 
compensation levels may differ for other supply- and demand-
related reasons as well. 
For example, in addition to providing training, residency 
positions also provide the credentials necessary for a future 
career as a physician.268 Participation in a residency program is a 
precondition both for future licensure as a physician and for 
board certification.269 Given these benefits of residency programs, 
it is not surprising that demand for these positions is high or that 
residents are willing to work for less monetary compensation 
than other professionals (such as physician assistants).270 In 
2003, there were 23,965 active applicants—including 14,332 U.S. 
senior students, 1,987 U.S. foreign graduates, and 5,029 non-U.S. 
                                                          
physicians’ work often changes after their training is complete. Many physicians develop 
office-based rather than hospital-based practices; while such physicians may on occasion 
care for hospitalized patients, they are often not hospital employees and are not required 
to admit their patients to any particular hospital. See BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, 
supra note 251 (noting that less than one quarter of physicians are employed by 
hospitals). Thus, hospitals may not ultimately receive the long-run returns that justify 
law firms’ high level of investment in and compensation of their associates. See Chae, 
supra note 1, at 355 (noting hospitals’ disincentive to train because “laborers can leave 
and take their skills elsewhere”). 
 266. Students benefiting from training provide their services at low cost in other 
professions as well. Nursing students, for example, have also traditionally served as a 
source of cheap labor. See LUDMERER, supra note 39, at 422 n.61 (citing SUSAN M. 
REVERBY, ORDERED TO CARE: THE DILEMMA OF AMERICAN NURSING, 1850-1945 (1987)). 
 267. See supra note 171 and accompanying text (discussing the value residents place 
on the educational benefit of residency programs). 
 268. See supra note 39 and accompanying text (discussing the residency 
requirement). 
 269. See supra note 39 and accompanying text. 
 270. See Crall, supra note 1, at 270 (noting the “steep nature of the demand curve for 
medical residencies” arising from the gateway role of medical residencies). For further 
discussion of the gateway effect, see supra subpart III.D (explaining that low residency 
compensation might not deter potential residents because of the long-run benefits of a 
medical career). 
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foreign graduates—for 20,908 positions.271 While supply and 
demand conditions for each program vary, the higher the number 
of qualified applicants, the less programs will need to pay to 
attract candidates, all else equal.272 
Teaching hospitals’ demand for residents (and thus, the 
supply of residency positions) will depend on the costs and 
benefits of employing residents, costs and benefits that are likely 
to differ from those associated with employing other health care 
professionals. Costs of employing residents include the direct 
costs of training, such as the cost of physician supervision.273 
Other costs are indirect. An analysis based on 1981 data 
indicated that inpatient hospital costs “increase[d] by about 5.8 
percent for every 10 percent increase in the resident-to-bed ratio” 
of the hospital.274 In part, these higher costs may result from 
inefficiencies in residents’ provision of care; residents may, for 
example, order more tests than more experienced physicians 
would.275 To the extent that these costs are connected with the 
employment of residents, rather than other professionals, they 
may affect the demand for residents and thus affect equilibrium 
resident compensation.276 
Teaching hospitals’ demand for residents is also determined 
by the benefit residents generate, which in turn is derived in part 
from the demand of payers for resident and teaching hospital 
services. Historical evidence suggests that resident compensation 
increases in the post-World War II (and post-match) era were 
tied to reimbursement by private insurers and the creation of 
Medicare and Medicaid, programs that provided financial 
support for graduate medical education.277 Today, Medicare 
                                                          
 271. See NAT’L RESIDENT MATCHING PROGRAM, supra note 216, at 5, 7. 
 272. See HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ECONOMICS AND FEDERAL ANTITRUST LAW 6–7 
(1985) (discussing the basic economic principles of supply and demand). 
 273. MEDICARE PAYMENT ADVISORY COMM’N, REPORT TO THE CONGRESS: MEDICARE 
PAYMENT POLICY 53 (2003). 
 274. Id. at 55.  
 275. See Huckman & Barro, supra note 248, at 11 (describing studies finding that 
inexperienced physicians tend to provide more costly care). Higher costs may also reflect 
teaching hospitals’ tendency to offer sophisticated technological services. Such services 
are expensive to provide and also attract more severely ill patients than nonteaching 
hospitals typically serve. MEDICARE PAYMENT ADVISORY COMM’N, supra note 263, at 5. 
 276. One commentator suggests that the cost of training medical residents in fact 
exceeds the value these residents generate until the residents’ third year of residency. 
Christine Wiebe, Federal Cuts for Medical Training—Bad Medicine or Chance to 
Improve?, ACP OBSERVER, July 1996, at 1, available at http://www.acponline.org/journals/ 
news/jul96/fedcuts.htm. 
 277. See LUDMERER, supra note 39, at 192 (arguing that interns and residents 
received salaries for the first time as a result of private insurers’ policy to reimburse 
hospitals for their services, and stating that in the four years after the passage of 
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provides the bulk of financial support tied explicitly to the 
employment of residents.278 When a resident provides care to a 
Medicare beneficiary, the resident is not permitted to bill 
Medicare for his or her physician services as a nonresident 
physician would.279 Medicare instead compensates the hospital for 
the resident’s services through its “direct” funding of the 
Graduate Medical Education (GME) program.280 In 1998, 
Medicare direct GME payments totaled over two billion dollars.281 
To compensate for the higher costs of operating a teaching 
hospital, Medicare also applies an “indirect” medical education 
adjustment to the formula it would otherwise use to pay for the 
hospital care supplied to Medicare patients.282 This formula, like 
the direct GME formula, depends in part on the number of 
residents participating in an institution’s GME program.283 
Specifically, it increases the amount a teaching hospital would 
otherwise receive by a factor based on the resident-to-bed ratio of 
the hospital.284 In 1998, for example, the formula mandated that 
hospitals receive a seven percent increase in reimbursement for 
every ten percent increase in the resident-to-bed ratio.285 In that 
year, Medicare paid nearly five billion dollars in indirect medical 
education subsidies.286 Although there is no requirement that the 
direct or indirect medical education subsidies be passed on to 
                                                          
Medicare and Medicaid, the median house staff salary doubled). 
 278. See Wiebe, supra note 276 (“Through Medicare’s hospital trust fund[,] . . . the 
federal government foots the bill for much of this training by including payment for direct 
and indirect teaching costs in hospital reimbursements.”). 
 279. 42 C.F.R. § 415.200 (2004). Medicare may, however, be billed for physicians’ 
services if a teaching physician personally furnishes services to a patient, or if the 
resident furnishes the service in the presence of a teaching physician. § 415.170. Medicare 
will also pay for physicians’ services provided by residents who are fully licensed and are 
“moonlighting” by providing services outside of their residency program (in a hospital 
emergency room, for example). § 415.208. The antitrust suit plaintiffs offered as evidence 
of anticompetitive behavior the fact that hourly resident compensation was “substantially 
lower than what those same physicians can (and sometimes do) earn providing services to 
a hospital during off-duty hours (‘moonlighting’).” Complaint, supra note 1, ¶ 93. The fact 
that Medicare reimburses for physician services provided by residents while 
moonlighting, but not for services provided through the residency program, may 
contribute to this compensation differential. 
 280. See generally 42 C.F.R. §§ 413.75–.83. 
 281. COUNCIL ON GRADUATE MED. EDUC., FIFTEENTH REPORT, FINANCING GRADUATE 
MEDICAL EDUCATION IN A CHANGING HEALTH CARE ENVIRONMENT 23 tbl.1 (2000), 
available at http://www.cogme.gov/15.pdf. 
 282. MEDICARE PAYMENT ADVISORY COMM’N, supra note 273, at 53. 
 283. See id. 
 284. Id. 
 285. Id. at 55. The IME adjustment for 2003 was 5.5%. Id. 
 286. COUNCIL ON GRADUATE MED. EDUC., supra note 281, at 23 tbl.1. 
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residents, Medicare financing helps to support resident 
compensation at its current levels.287 
On the other hand, the lower the overall reimbursement 
levels for resident and teaching hospital services—and the higher 
the costs of resident training—the less teaching hospitals will be 
willing and able to pay to obtain resident services, all else equal. 
Medicare provides significant financial support for the provision 
of medical education, but not so much that every hospital chooses 
to employ residents.288 While private payers historically 
subsidized education-related costs through higher payments to 
teaching hospitals, these subsidies have diminished in recent 
years.289 In general, it is clear that the relationship between the 
employment of a resident and financial benefit to a teaching 
hospital is complex; the economics of employing a resident are 
quite different from those of employing a nonresident physician 
or a physician assistant. Compensation levels for residents are 
therefore likely to differ from those for other medical 
professionals.290 
Instead of comparing residents to nonresidents, the ideal 
empirical analysis would compare residents to residents. More 
specifically, it would compare the compensation of residents in a 
market with a matching mechanism to the compensation of the 
same residents in the same market without such a mechanism. 
Unfortunately, since a market cannot simultaneously have a 
match and not have a match, such a comparison is impossible to 
observe in practice. An alternative methodology would involve 
comparing compensation before and after a market adopts a 
match. While no published study appears to have undertaken a 
systematic analysis of this sort, historical research has shown 
                                                          
 287. Several scholars have noted the direct connection between residency education 
subsidies and the demand for residents, although not necessarily the indirect connection 
between subsidies and the wages paid to residents. See, e.g., Fitzhugh Mullan, The Case 
for More U.S. Medical Students, 343 NEW ENG. J. MED. 213, 215 (2000) (“[T]he current 
limitation on the number of Medicare-reimbursed residency positions provides a strong 
disincentive to expand training programs.”). Sean Nicholson and David Song found in an 
empirical study that a $1,000 increase in indirect medical education payment per resident 
increased the number of residents hired by 0.12%. They speculated that one possible 
reason for the small increase was the constrained supply of residents. Sean Nicholson & 
David Song, The Incentive Effects of the Medicare Indirect Medical Education Policy, 20 J. 
HEALTH ECON. 909, 928 (2001). 
 288. See MEDICARE PAYMENT ADVISORY COMM’N, supra note 273, at 49 tbl.2A-6 
(showing that in 2001 there were 1122 teaching hospitals and 3166 nonteaching 
hospitals). 
 289. COUNCIL ON GRADUATE MED. EDUC., supra note 281, at 2. 
 290. The fact that government intervention in the medical education market may 
complicate the evaluation of antitrust claims is noted by Hammer & Sage, supra note 256, 
at 93. 
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that before World War II—and thus before the match—first-year 
residents worked in return for room and board with minimal 
additional compensation.291 The presence of low stipends before 
the match cannot conclusively prove that the match does not 
depress salaries, because it is possible that post-World War II 
salaries would have been even higher had the match not existed. 
It does strongly suggest, however, that factors other than the 
match—such as the cost and value of training—may be the 
source of low stipends. 
A second methodology would involve comparing 
compensation in markets with a match to similar markets that 
exist at the same time but do not have a match. Professors 
Muriel Niederle and Alvin Roth have shown that internal 
medicine subspecialties that use matching mechanisms to fill 
fellowship positions (positions that offer training beyond that 
provided by residency programs) do not offer salaries 
significantly below those of programs that do not use the 
match.292 One concern about this methodology is that programs 
that choose to adopt the match may differ systematically from 
those that do not. For example, if programs believe that the 
match facilitates wage suppression, programs subject to upward 
pressure on wages would be more likely to adopt the match; if the 
programs’ belief were correct, then the match might successfully 
lower wages to the levels existing in programs without matches. 
The result would be similar wages in both programs, despite the 
effect of the match. However, to the extent that the adoption of 
matching mechanisms is a result of concerns unconnected to 
wages, such as concerns about the problematic consequences of 
early offers, this evidence shows that the residency match itself 
does not depress compensation.293 
                                                          
 291. See Frank Michota, Do Today’s Residents Really Have It Better?, 64 CLEVELAND 
CLINIC J. MED. 457 (1997), available at http://www.ccjm.org/1minuteconsults/oct7com. 
htm. Ludmerer reports that “house officers received token compensation: from nothing to 
$10 a month for interns, and $10 to $25 a month for residents.” LUDMERER, supra note 39, 
at 96. 
 292. Niederle & Roth, supra note 259, at 1153. While concluding that “eliminating 
the resident match would not necessarily increase residents’ wages,” the authors also note 
the significant differences between fellowship and residency programs. Id. These 
differences may preclude the application of insights about fellowship wages to the 
residency wage context. See Sanders H. Chae, Correspondence, Is the Match Illegal?, 348 
NEW ENG. J. MED. 2255, 2261 (2003) (arguing in response to a letter to the editor that a 
labor surplus might produce low salaries in the fellowship market, while there is a labor 
shortage in the residency market for American medical graduates). For further research 
on gastroenterology fellowships, see generally Muriel Niederle & Alvin E. Roth, The 
Gastroenterology Fellowship Match: How It Failed and Why It Could Succeed Once Again, 
127 GASTROENTEROLOGY 658 (2004). 
 293. See supra Part III.B (discussing Roth’s research on the problem of market 
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Thus, while empirical evidence suggests that resident 
compensation is indeed low relative to that of nonresident 
physicians and other health care professionals, these differences 
may result from factors unrelated to the match, including 
differences in productivity, nonmonetary compensation in the 
form of medical training, and variations in supply and demand 
conditions. (The lawsuit plaintiffs might also argue that the 
differences result from the defendants’ sharing of stipend 
information294 and various activities of the ACGME, including 
limits on the number of residency positions,295 but a full analysis 
of these issues is beyond the scope of this Article.) Furthermore, 
while not conclusive, empirical evidence comparing compensation 
in markets with matching mechanisms to compensation in 
markets without matching mechanisms tends to suggest that 
such mechanisms do not have a substantial effect on 
compensation.296 
V. THE ANTITRUST EXEMPTION AND OTHER REGULATORY 
RESPONSES 
The procompetitive justifications for the match and the lack 
of empirical evidence of an anticompetitive effect together 
suggest that the match should be preserved. The likelihood that 
the match is procompetitive, Congress’s concern about the 
                                                          
“unraveling”). Another methodology would involve a comparison of compensation trends 
over time in programs adopting or abandoning the match to trends in programs that have 
not. No published study appears to have undertaken such an analysis, perhaps because of 
data limitations. 
 294. For example, the AAMC conducts an annual wage survey that may enable 
collusion on employment terms by facilitating uniform wage-setting and the monitoring of 
deviations from uniformity. See Complaint, supra note 1, ¶¶ 73–82. On the other hand, 
the collection of wage information may also benefit competition by giving both residents 
and programs the information they need to assess whether their compensation levels 
remain competitive. 
 295. See supra note 2 (describing plaintiff allegations with respect to accreditation 
activities); supra note 212 (describing ACGME limitations on residency positions). If the 
ACGME limits do constrain the number of residents trained within a specialty, they will 
also constrain the number of physicians ultimately practicing within the specialty. Chae, 
supra note 1, at 355. The result is that although resident compensation might be less than 
the competitive level, residents will face fewer competitors upon completion of the 
program and may therefore ultimately obtain compensation at higher levels as 
independently practicing physicians. Id. While teaching hospitals may benefit from lower 
resident wages in the short run, they may be harmed by higher physician salaries in the 
long run. Higher physician salaries will tend to increase hospital expenses if the hospitals 
employ physicians. Even if hospitals do not employ physicians, high salaries may harm 
hospitals by decreasing demand for physician services that are complementary to hospital 
services. Thus, while resident limits may at first seem to benefit teaching programs and 
hospitals, it is not clear that in the long run the limits would have such an effect. 
 296. Niederle & Roth, supra note 259, at 1153. 
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“burden and expense of defending against litigation,”297 and its 
finding that the match has “effectively served the interests of 
medical students, teaching hospitals, and patients for over half a 
century”298 justify the grant of an antitrust exemption. 
As Senator Kohl observed, however, it is often bad policy to 
provide exemptions to antitrust laws.299 The antitrust laws 
protect competition because competition produces many societal 
benefits. Concern about undermining these benefits is one reason 
why exceptions to antitrust law are so limited. Statutory 
exemptions are rare.300 The state action doctrine exempts state 
government regulation from antitrust law, but only if “[t]he 
challenged activity is authorized by a ‘clearly articulated’ state 
regulatory policy,” and “[a]ny private conduct authorized by the 
state policy is ‘actively supervised’ by an appropriate 
governmental agency.”301 Given our reluctance to grant broad 
exceptions to the antitrust laws, it is reasonable to ask whether 
the antitrust exemption for the residency match is appropriately 
limited. 
By attaching to the exemption legislation the label 
“Confirmation of Antitrust Status,”302 the authors of the 
legislation were in effect asserting that the exemption was 
consistent with the purposes of antitrust law and presumably 
with the outcome of a properly decided antitrust suit. 
Consistency would require, however, that the antitrust 
exemption be limited in scope. Consider the series of arguments 
that might be raised if a suit focusing on the match were fully 
litigated. The plaintiffs would allege that teaching hospitals 
across the country acted together through the residency match to 
depress compensation in violation of the Sherman Act. The 
defendants would argue in response that the potential of the 
match to promote competition by facilitating fully informed 
decisionmaking suggests that it should be analyzed under the 
rule of reason.303 But the defendants’ ability to offer a 
                                                          
 297. 15 U.S.C.A. § 37b(a)(2)(B) (West Supp. 2005). By early 2005, more than 100 
attorneys had become involved in the case, and the “teaching medical establishment” was 
said to have incurred more than $20 million in litigation-related costs. Croasdale, supra 
note 13. 
 298. 15 U.S.C.A. § 37b(a)(1)(E). 
 299. 150 CONG. REC. S3979 (daily ed. Apr. 8, 2004) (statement of Sen. Kohl). 
 300. For a list of such exceptions, see Memorandum from the Immunities & 
Exemptions Working Group to All Comm’rs, supra note 16, at 3–5. 
 301. HERBERT HOVENKAMP, FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY § 20.3, at 727–28 (2d ed. 
1999). 
 302. 15 U.S.C.A. § 37b. 
 303. For a more thorough antitrust analysis of the case, see Miller & Greaney, supra 
note 1, at 915–16. For a discussion of the application of the rule of reason in general, see 
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procompetitive rationale for the operation of the residency 
match—the fact that the match may increase “output” by 
improving match quality—would not automatically result in a 
favorable verdict. Under the standard rule-of-reason analysis, a 
seemingly procompetitive restraint may still be deemed an 
antitrust violation if the plaintiff can demonstrate that it is not 
the least-restrictive alternative.304 One question that might be 
asked, then, is whether the procompetitive objectives of the 
match might be achieved with a mechanism that is less 
restrictive. If so, the exemption should be narrowed to encompass 
only the less restrictive alternative. 
One argument along these lines is that while the matching 
algorithm itself should be subject to the protection of the 
exemption, some of the rules that support it should not be. One 
might argue, for example, that the rules of the match should be 
loosened to permit more contracting outside of it. As discussed in 
Parts II and III, match rules can be quite stringent. For example, 
residency programs participating in the residency match agree to 
hire seniors in U.S. medical schools only through the match.305 
Violations of the match, including refusals to accept a match 
assignment, are subject to sanctions, including a prohibition 
against match participation and reporting of the violation.306 The 
antitrust suit plaintiffs objected to many of these rules.307 
Supporters of the plaintiffs might argue that even if the 
exemption precludes an antitrust challenge to the operation of 
the matching algorithm, it should allow a challenge to some of 
the more restrictive rules of the match. The problem with this 
argument is that loosening the rules would likely destroy the 
residency match. The more positions allocated outside of the 
match, the smaller the benefit of the match to match 
participants. The more positions allocated outside of the match, 
the more pressure participants will feel to consider these 
positions, and the more the process will resemble the unraveling 
market the match is designed to avoid. 
A second frequently articulated less-restrictive-alternative 
argument is that the unraveling problem could be avoided 
entirely through the imposition of rules related to offer timing.308 
                                                          
generally 7 PHILLIP E. AREEDA, ANTITRUST LAW ¶ 1511 (1986). 
 304. See AREEDA, supra note 303, ¶ 1511, at 429. 
 305. NRMP, supra note 68, § 4.2. 
 306. See NRMP, supra note 19, § 7.0 for a discussion of violation sanctions. Match 
rules do include some flexibility with respect to participants’ needs. See id. §§ 2.5, 3.4 
(contemplating the possibility of waiver of match commitments). 
 307. Complaint, supra note 1, ¶¶ 85–86. 
 308. See Crall, supra note 1, at 271–72 (suggesting that coordinated offer timing 
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Specifically, the imposition of a date before which programs 
would be prohibited from making offers could address the early-
offer problem, while a mandatory minimum period for holding 
offers open could address the exploding-offer problem.309 
Advocates of such rules might argue, in fact, that the antitrust 
exemption should be completely eliminated because these rules 
would achieve all of the benefits of the match in a less restrictive 
way.310 Historically, however, such rules have failed.311 As 
discussed in subpart III.B, it was the failure of precisely these 
sorts of rules that led to the creation of residency match. 
While strict enforcement of these rules would ensure that 
both programs and residents would have the opportunity to 
evaluate potential partners, it would fail to address an important 
contributor to the unraveling phenomenon. Because programs 
still would face self-imposed or ACGME-imposed resource-based 
constraints on the number of positions available,312 they would 
still have to make offers sequentially, waiting for a definitive 
negative response before making another offer. A hospital that 
cannot afford to finance residency positions from its own funds, 
for example, would not want to risk making offers (and receiving 
acceptances) for more positions than Medicare is willing to 
subsidize.313 This means that programs would have to target their 
initial offers carefully in order to avoid losing their favored 
candidates to other programs. They might choose to make an 
offer only to their second-choice candidate, for example, because 
they suspect that their first-choice candidate will eventually take 
another offer. Residents, meanwhile, would face a choice between 
accepting the first position offered them or declining and hoping 
that a preferred offer would arrive later. These are once again 
the problems the match is designed to avoid. Imposition of 
deadlines alone could not achieve the procompetitive benefits of 
the match. 
On the other hand, it may be possible to enhance the 
procompetitive benefits of the match by increasing competition 
inside of it. First, programs should be required to disclose 
                                                          
would be a less restrictive means of “keeping transaction costs low, avoiding 
informational problems, and eliminating externalities”). 
 309. See, e.g., id. (suggesting that hospitals be required to “make their offers by a 
certain date” and “hold offers open until a certain later date”). 
 310. Id. at 271–74 (arguing that regulation of offer dates and acceptance deadlines is 
a less restrictive means of achieving the benefits of the match). 
 311. See Roth, supra note 57, at 993–95. 
 312. See supra note 212 and accompanying text (describing residency position limits). 
 313. See supra Part IV (discussing the financing of medical residency positions, 
including the cap on the number of Medicare-subsidized positions). 
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compensation levels and other terms of employment before the 
ranking deadline. If programs disclose compensation only after 
the matching process, competitive pressure is limited: Once 
matched, residents are contractually committed to join the 
assigned residency program, their second-choice programs are 
likely full, and other possibilities (such as waiting for next year’s 
match, or pursuing another profession) are undesirable. If 
programs always disclosed their compensation packages before 
the ranking deadline, on the other hand, prospective residents 
could easily compare these packages across programs and take 
this information into account when compiling their rank-order 
lists. Programs currently are free to provide compensation terms 
before the ranking deadline, and most likely do.314 A disclosure 
requirement would ensure that all programs provided such 
information, however, and not just upon the request of individual 
applicants who might be reluctant to ask. In recognition of the 
merits of such a policy, the NRMP recently adopted a rule that 
requires programs to provide a sample of the contract applicants 
would be expected to sign upon being matched to the residency 
program.315 
Because such disclosure is critical to the effective 
functioning of the matching mechanism, Congress should 
incorporate into the antitrust exemption statute a similar 
requirement that programs provide all interviewed applicants a 
copy of the actual contract that they would be expected to sign. If 
structured as a condition for the exemption, the requirement 
would give an additional incentive for programs to provide 
compensation information. If the programs failed to comply, thus 
reducing the procompetitive benefits of the match, plaintiffs 
could then bring an antitrust action similar to the one brought by 
former residents in 2002.316 Alternatively, Congress could create 
an independent mandate of disclosure, and give antitrust 
enforcement agencies (or the Department of Health and Human 
Services) the power to enforce it through fines or other measures. 
                                                          
 314. Many disclose this information on program websites or through the Fellowship 
and Residency Electronic Interactive Database (FREIDA). See, e.g., Am. Med. Ass’n, 
FREIDA Online, http://www.ama-assn.org/ama/pub/category/2997.html (last visited Oct. 
1, 2005). 
 315. See supra note 65 (describing the current NRMP rule on sample contracts); see 
also Press Release, Nat’l Residency Matching Program, NRMP Requires Medical 
Residency Programs to Show Contracts to Applicants (Oct. 31, 2003), available at http:// 
www.nrmp.org/contractpr.pdf (reporting that the new rule requiring the provision of 
sample contracts would be effective in 2005).  
 316. See generally Complaint, supra note 1. 
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Either alternative would permit enforcement approaches more 
expansive than those currently available to the NRMP. 
To achieve the maximum possible competitive benefit, it is 
imperative that program disclosures be accurate. In other words, 
the “sample contract” should not just be a representative 
example of the type of contract that the resident would be 
expected to sign, but instead an actual offer of a contingent 
contract. By submitting a rank-order listing that contains a 
particular program’s name, the resident would accept the 
program’s offer, forming a contingent contract. If the parties are 
successfully matched, they would then be bound to comply with 
the terms of the contingent contract. If a resident’s submission of 
rankings indeed constitutes an acceptance of all contingent 
contract offers, the resident will necessarily be able to compile 
rankings based on full and accurate information about program 
terms. The match’s competitive potential will be realized. 
Until recently, however, the creation of contingent contracts 
appears to have been prohibited. Match rules expressly 
prohibited the formation of “any verbal or written contract” 
before the match;317 presumably, this broad prohibition would 
have applied to contingent contracts. Prohibitions on contingent 
contracting, however, are not necessary to achieve the 
procompetitive benefits of the residency match;318 elimination of 
the prohibition would thus be consistent with antitrust doctrine 
requiring that a procompetitive restraint be the least restrictive 
alternative. The recent NRMP requirement for disclosure of 
sample contracts, if interpreted to mandate adherence to sample 
contract terms, would seem to have eliminated this prohibition.319 
The federal antitrust exemption should reinforce this result by 
mandating that programs enter contracts contingent on the 
outcome of the match. 
Another way to increase competition without undermining 
the match would be to encourage the creation of individualized 
contingent contracts. Rather than posting a sample contract with 
terms that would apply to all residents, programs could 
                                                          
 317. NRMP, supra note 68, § 8.0.  
 318. See Hammer & Sage, supra note 256, at 93 (“[S]pecific details of the NRMP, 
such as prohibitions on negotiating terms of employment prior to matching, are troubling 
because they go beyond the type of ancillary restriction necessary to achieve the 
program’s legitimate goals.”). 
 319. An NRMP policy that did not mandate program adherence to sample contract 
terms would likely be less effective in increasing competition. Concerns about developing 
a reputation for deviating from sample contract terms may still encourage programs to 
adopt the sample contract as the actual contract, however, thus preserving the benefits of 
competition even in the absence of a mandate. 
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announce minimum stipends or stipend ranges, but then provide 
individualized sample contracts to each interviewed applicant. To 
the extent that these individualized sample contracts also 
contained individualized stipends, they would facilitate the 
competitive process. For example, the compensation offered 
would provide some evidence of the program’s intensity of 
preference for a particular resident.320 In circumstances in which 
residents’ preferences depend on programs’ preferences for them, 
this information would help residents make more fully informed 
decisions. Residents could also use the information contained in 
individualized contracts as a tool to negotiate better offers from 
other programs. Admittedly, contingent contracts are less than 
ideal for both of these purposes because they are not necessarily 
credible. Programs’ rank-orders need not correspond to the level 
of compensation offered; indeed, programs could offer excellent 
employment terms to all applicants, but then exclude some 
applicants from their ranking lists. To the extent that programs 
are concerned about filling their slots, however, they will include 
as many acceptable candidates as possible on their rank-order 
lists. In addition, transaction costs associated with 
individualizing contracts may discourage programs from 
providing contracts to candidates they do not intend to rank. In 
either case, the individualized contracts would facilitate 
competition. 
Individualized compensation would mitigate a number of the 
concerns that have been raised in connection with the residency 
match. Both of the theoretical economic studies showing the 
relationship between matching mechanisms and wage depression 
focus on systems under which programs cannot distinguish 
                                                          
 320. Because compensation offers, like rank-order lists, provide information about 
participants’ preferences and intentions, it is reasonable to ask why the same rules should 
not apply to both. In particular, pre-match solicitation of rank-orderings from match 
participants is prohibited. See supra note 71 and accompanying text. Why should 
compensation information be treated differently? There are at least two justifications for 
prohibiting solicitation of ranking information. First, if the ranking information provided 
is incorrect or vague when given, or becomes incorrect due to later modification, then the 
prohibition prevents unethical behavior and ensures that participants are not misled. 
Second, if the ranking information is correct, then the prohibition prevents unraveling. If 
programs are permitted to make binding commitments to a particular ranking, then 
candidates must be sure to interview before the program makes commitments to other 
interviewees. The result is the same chain of events the match is intended to prevent. 
Neither of these two concerns applies to contingent offers of compensation. First, because 
the contract is binding if a match is made, there is no risk of a party being misled about 
compensation. Second, because there is no necessary connection between salary offers and 
rankings, because programs’ financial exposure is limited by the number of residency 
slots offered through the match, and because budgets may be somewhat flexible, one high 
contingent offer of compensation need not preclude another. Thus, disclosure of 
compensation information need not induce unraveling. 
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among candidates in setting their wages.321 But when 
compensation is allowed to vary in Bulow and Levin’s model, the 
matching mechanism achieves the efficient result.322 Similarly, 
individualized wages address the ordinal ranking concern raised 
by Professor Priest by allowing cardinal expressions of 
preferences.323 Programs can indicate the strength of their 
preferences through individualized compensation offers in 
addition to rankings, thus preventing the match from making 
inefficient assignments of residents to programs. 
It is not clear that residency programs would choose to 
individualize employment terms. From an efficiency perspective, 
if all residents selected by a program had similar characteristics, 
there would be little reason to vary employment terms. Lack of 
proven variation in productive capabilities may be one reason 
that residents within a program are generally offered the same 
compensation. On the other hand, it cannot explain why 
compensation often does not vary across programs within an 
institution. Third-year residents in surgery programs may 
receive the same compensation as third-year residents in 
internal medicine programs, despite significant differences in the 
incomes of independent physicians in these specialties.324 The 
tendency of similarities in compensation to persist despite 
differences in skill sets may instead be due to expectations of 
“fair” treatment within an institution. Administering 
compensation packages may be less costly when they are 
consistent across employees, in part because the need to monitor 
for favoritism is reduced.325 Many employers offer similar 
compensation levels to their workers, despite potentially 
                                                          
 321. See supra note 82 and accompanying text. Kamecke suggests that when 
programs do not offer individualized wages, there may be no wage that equates supply 
and demand; the result is “disorderly behavior” that is then addressed by a matching 
mechanism. See Kamecke, supra note 80, at 34. The Kamecke model assumes that wages 
within programs are uniform, and states that “it is the major objective of the paper to 
discuss the consequences of this restriction on the wage formation in an organized entry-
level job market.” See id. at 37. 
 322. See supra text accompanying note 174.  
 323. See supra Part III.C.3 (explaining Priest’s argument that matching mechanisms 
based only on ordinal expressions of preferences can result in inefficiency). 
 324. For example, the Baylor College of Medicine Program pays $41,517 to third-year 
residents in both the internal medicine and surgery programs; the University of 
Minnesota Program pays $44,630 to third-year residents in both programs. See Am. Med. 
Ass’n, supra note 314 (providing detailed program information about the characteristics of 
individual residency programs). 
 325. See Susan J. Stabile, Motivating Executives: Does Performance-Based 
Compensation Positively Affect Managerial Performance?, 2 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 227, 
259 (1999). 
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observable differences in worker quality.326 For these reasons, it 
is not obvious that residency programs would, or even necessarily 
should, choose to individualize employment terms. 
Given the potential benefits of individualized compensation 
for competition, however, regulators should facilitate 
individualized contracting for programs inclined to engage in it. 
In addition to potentially increasing efficiency, individualized 
contracting would make both express and tacit collusion much 
more difficult relative to a system under which institutions 
offered the same contract to all residents participating in the 
institutions’ programs. Variations in compensation levels would 
complicate any efforts by independent institutions to agree upon 
a single level of compensation, or to enforce adherence to such an 
agreement. 
A contingent contract mandate might itself encourage 
individualized contracting by encouraging open discussion of 
contract terms before rankings are submitted. Mandating that 
the contingent contracts be individualized—requiring that they 
include the applicant’s name and signature, for example—might 
further facilitate the tailoring of compensation packages. While 
programs might still choose to offer the same compensation 
package to each of their applicants, the mandate would provide a 
natural opening for more compensation negotiation than would 
otherwise exist. The mandate would serve as an opportunity for 
programs to depart from any norms that might inefficiently 
discourage individual negotiation. Programs could publicize 
minimum compensation or compensation ranges on their 
websites or through the FREIDA database, so that prospective 
applicants would have general information about compensation 
before they apply, but then supplement this information with the 
individualized sample contract. It would not be appropriate, 
though, to actually mandate tailored compensation. Such a 
mandate would not likely be administrable,327 and individualized 
compensation might in some cases be determined to be inefficient 
or unfair. A mandate to provide individualized contingent 
contracts, however, might eventually increase the frequency of 
                                                          
 326. See, e.g., Stephen Machin & Alan Manning, A Test of Competitive Labor Market 
Theory: The Wage Structure Among Care Assistants in the South of England, 57 INDUS. & 
LAB. REL. REV. 371, 371–74 (2004) (finding “surprisingly little wage dispersion within 
firms” despite the effective lack of “external constraints on the wage-setting process”). For 
discussions of the practice of uniform compensation and its potential causes, see, for 
example, Bulow & Levin, supra note 82, at 27, and MANNING, supra note 241, at 134–36. 
 327. For instance, how much would resident compensation packages be required to 
vary? 
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negotiation over compensation packages and thus improve 
competition within the residency match system. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The antitrust suit filed by former medical residents against 
organizations that operate and participate in the residency 
match raised important questions about the process of graduate 
medical education in the United States. Residency training 
demands multiple years of work for long hours at compensation 
lower than that of other medical professionals. By preventing the 
creation of credible firm offers to individual residents, the 
residency match weakens individual residents’ ability to 
negotiate better compensation. Economic theory suggests that 
under certain assumptions matching mechanisms may depress 
compensation and impede the efficient functioning of markets 
relative to a competitive ideal. 
On the other hand, market imperfections and market 
failures almost certainly would prevent the realization of this 
ideal. The residency match is a market intervention that 
promotes competition by assuring market participants a wide 
range of potential partners and an opportunity for fully informed 
decisionmaking. The residency match helps to achieve a more 
efficient pairing of residents and programs than would be 
generated by an unraveling market, perhaps contributing to 
higher resident compensation than would otherwise exist, and 
likely increasing gains to society as a whole. Given these 
arguments and the considerable cost of litigation, the 
congressional grant of an antitrust exemption is justified. 
Having sacrificed the protections provided by the antitrust 
laws, however, Congress has now taken on the responsibility for 
protecting the public against anticompetitive behavior. It is 
unfortunate that the antitrust exemption was enacted without a 
full airing of the arguments on both sides of the residency debate. 
Much remains to be understood about the nature and magnitude 
of the effects of the match. When Congress created a retroactive 
antitrust exemption, it likely precluded an exploration of these 
issues through litigation. It should therefore now actively study 
the effects of the match, and work to promote competition 
through measures such as a legislative requirement for pre-
ranking deadline offers of contingent contracts to individual 
match participants. 
In its roles as a payer for medical education, a purchaser of 
care, and a protector of the public interest, Congress should 
consider the effect of market interventions such as the match on 
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the welfare of not just residents and residency programs, but also 
the public as a whole. In a market characterized by failures and 
imperfections, market interventions may improve social welfare. 
Continued vigilance is required to ensure that they actually do 
so. 
 
